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he U.S. pistachio industry, located almost exclu-
sively in California, has experienced phenomenal 
growth over the past 30 years, both in absolute terms 
and as a share of the global pistachio industry, which 
has also grown rapidly. In recent years, a group of 
growers led an initiative to establish a federal market-
ing order that would mandate quality standards and 
an inspection program to assure consistency in the 
quality of California pistachios, thereby increasing 
consumer demand and conﬁdence in the product, and 
enhance producer returns. Hearings sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) were held in 
2002 and the marketing order will be established in 
August 2005.
The federal marketing order for California pis-
tachios will be funded by revenues raised using 
assessments on each pound of pistachios processed 
for the domestic market. If the policy is effective as 
envisaged, beneﬁts from demand enhancement will 
more than offset the cost of the assessments. In 2002, 
Sumner undertook an initial study to estimate the 
likely costs and beneﬁts of the proposed program 
and presented testimony at public hearings in Fresno 
on July 23–25, 2002. We have extended that work to 
encompass a broader range of modeling approaches 
and assumptions and a much more comprehensive 
investigation of the supply and demand fundamentals. 
This report documents the industry situation, the 
issues to be addressed by the policy, the model, and 
results from the beneﬁt-cost assessment. As well as 
being of speciﬁc interest in its own right, this analysis 
sets some useful precedents as the ﬁrst ex ante quanti-
tative analysis of a collective action program designed 
to enhance demand through quality assurance.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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2. THE CALIFORNIA PISTACHIO INDUSTRY  
AND THE NEW MARKETING ORDER
T
he California pistachio industry has grown quick-
ly and now occupies an important and growing 
share of the world market. Prior to discussing our 
model of the industry, it is useful to discuss trends in 
production and consumption, the issue of aﬂatoxin in 
pistachios, the economic rationale for a collective ac-
tion program in the industry, and the speciﬁc features 
of the proposed marketing order.
2.1. Trends in Production  
and Consumption of Pistachios
World production of pistachios has grown rapidly 
during the past three decades and U.S. production has 
increased as a share of that growing total.1 Iran is still 
the largest producer, but the United States is estab-
lished as the second largest pistachio producer in the 
world, followed by Syria and Turkey, and is now the 
second largest exporter after Iran.2 The United States 
also imports small amounts.3 Figure 2.1 shows U.S. 
and world production over the years 1980–2003 and 
Appendix Table A1 provides details on national pro-
duction patterns. As well as showing strong total and 
U.S. growth, Figure 2.1 shows substantial year-to-year 
swings in production, reﬂecting yield variability.
Almost all U.S. pistachios are produced in 
California.4 The California pistachio industry has ex-
perienced phenomenal growth over the past 30 years. 
California’s production has grown more than 200-fold 
since 1976, when the ﬁrst commercial crop of 1.5 
million pounds was harvested. California produced a 
record crop of 302 million pounds in 2002, up from 
the previous record of approximately 242 million 
pounds in 2000. The 2003 crop was smaller—118 
million pounds. The longer-term trends have shown 
steadily increasing acreage, yields, quantities, and 
value of production and corresponding downward 
trends in prices with important ﬂuctuations around 
those trends. We have also seen steady growth in 
California exports as a share of world trade and as a 
share of production. 
Figure 2.2 shows California’s nonbearing, bear-
ing, and total acreage of pistachios over the years 
1980–2003 based on data shown in Appendix Table 
A2. Total acres of pistachios in California have in-
creased from 34,726 in 1980 to 111,000 in 2003. 
Normally, it takes a pistachio tree ﬁve or six years to 
mature before it produces an economically signiﬁcant 
crop and twelve to ﬁfteen years to reach full poten-
tial. Bearing acreage for 2003 was estimated by the 
California Agricultural Statistics Service (CASS) to be 
86,000 acres, up 6 percent from 83,000 bearing acres 
in 2002 and 234 percent from 25,773 bearing acres 
in 1980. The growth in area and production has been 
very consistent for the past 23 years and is expected 
to continue; nonbearing acreage reached 23,000 acres 
in 2003 (CASS). 
Annual production is variable and hard to predict. 
Like many other tree fruits and nuts, pistachio yields 
and production have an alternate bearing cycle. The 
trees generally have a high-yield year followed by a 
low-yield year, but there are exceptions, as can be seen 
1  Statistical information in this section was supplied by the California Pistachio Commission (CPC) unless otherwise noted. 
Some information was provided as a personal communication and some was taken directly from the Web site www.pistachios.
org.
2  Iran’s exports peaked in 1996, when it exported 308 million pounds of pistachios, but exports fell to 127 million pounds 
in 1997, the year Iranian pistachios were banned in the European Union because of high levels of aﬂatoxin. Iranian exports 
returned gradually to near pre-ban levels in the following few years.
3  Turkey is by far the largest exporter to the United States, accounting for 83 percent of all imported pistachios. Turkish pistachios 
are smaller than U.S. varieties and they also taste different. The total quantity of pistachios imported during the 2000–01 crop 
year was 1.8 million pounds or 0.8 percent of domestic production.
4  In 2000, Arizona produced 4 million pounds of pistachios on 2,700 acres, just 1.5 percent of national production that 
year (Arizona Agricultural Statistics Service). This share was too small to have a signiﬁcant impact on the national market for 
pistachios. New Mexico had 391 acres of pistachios in 1999, less then half a percent of total acreage (New Mexico Agricultural 
Statistics Service).Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Source: Appendix Table A1.
5  California pistachio yields were 1,055 pounds per acre in 1980 but fell to 523 pounds per acre in 1981. The yield rebounded 
in 1982 to 1,468 pounds per acre. The high-yield years 1992 and 1997 were both followed by even higher yields, breaking the 
alternate bearing pattern.
in Figure 2.3 (based on yield data shown in Appendix 
Table A2).5 Other factors affect production and yields, 
including weather and new trees coming into produc-
tion. The yield cycle is an important factor in quantity 
produced, price received, total value of the crop, and 
gross revenue per bearing acre (USDA Risk Manage-
ment Agency (RMA)).
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Pistachio quality also varies. A certain percentage 
of the nuts have not opened before they are harvested 
and are classiﬁed as “closed shell” or “shelling stock.” 
These nuts do not have the same value as “open shell” 
nuts but can be sold to processors or exported. Often, 
the share of nuts that have not split is higher during 
high-yield years. In 2000, 78.2 percent of the high-
yield crop was open-shell; the 1999 low-yield crop was 
85.3 percent open-shell. However, the 2002 record 
crop was 79.9 percent open-shell compared to 75.6 
percent for the lower-yield crop in 2003. Appendix 
Table A3 includes data on pistachio production and 
quantities and shares in the categories of closed-shell, 
shelling stock, and open-shell pistachios.
The value of the crop varies with the quan-
tity produced. The long-term trend is for increasing 
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quantity and increasing value of the crop but falling 
returns per pound, which reﬂects the fact that supply 
has been growing faster than demand. The trend for 
the past 23 years in price per pound (even in nominal 
terms) has been gradually downward from the high in 
1980 of $2.05 a pound to $1.15 per pound in 2003, 
as can be seen in Figure 2.4, which is based on data 
shown in Appendix Table A4.
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Despite declining prices, total value and gross rev-
enue per bearing acre have been trending up over the 
past 22 years. Total value has increased signiﬁcantly, 
mostly from increases in total acreage but also partly 
from increases in yield per acre. In 1980, California’s 
pistachio crop was valued at $55.8 million, only one-
sixth of the value of the 2002 crop. Gross revenue per 
bearing acre has gone up in the past 22 years, partly 
because California’s trees have been maturing and 
consequently producing higher yields. The ﬁve-year 
average of gross revenue per bearing acre was $1,642 
during 1980–1984, compared with $2,904 per acre 
during 1998–2002. Figure 2.5, which is based on data 
shown in Appendix Table A4, shows the trends in total 
value of production and gross value of production per 
bearing acre.
The alternate-bearing nature of pistachio trees 
plays a key role in the value of the crop. Production 
can change signiﬁcantly from one year to the next as 
a result of large changes in yield, but this can be miti-
gated by adjustments in reserve stocks. Price varies 
inversely with volume and California production is 
important enough to inﬂuence the world price, but 
part of the story is that California’s large-crop years 
have often coincided with large crops globally. With 
the exception of 2002, the total value and the value per 
acre in large-crop years have generally been higher in 
more recent years even though prices have been lower. 
Hence, the bumper pistachio crop in 2000 produced 
the second-highest crop value on record. The 241 mil-
lion pounds of pistachios produced that year had a 
total value of $239 million, or $3,207 per bearing acre. 
The average return per pound of $0.99 in 2000 was 
the lowest since 1984. However in 2002, the price was 
up to $1.11 per pound despite the 302 million pounds 
produced that year, which had a crop value of more 
than $335 million, or $4,044 per bearing acre.
Along with changes in the quantity and value of 
production, we have witnessed trends and year-to-year 
variation in allocation of the crop between domestic 
and export markets. Domestic consumption of pista-
chios increased from 10.9 million pounds in 1980–81 
to 56.5 million pounds in 2003–04, reﬂecting both an 
increase in population and an increase in per capita 
consumption from 0.05 to 0.22 pounds per person per 
year. The growth in per capita consumption reﬂects 
several factors, including lower real prices of pista-
chios compared with foods generally and compared 
with other nuts in particular, higher real incomes and 
income-responsive demand, and perhaps shifts of 
dietary patterns toward foods that are healthier, natu-
ral, and more convenient. Figure 2.6, which is based 
on the data shown in Appendix Table A5, compares 
trends in production and farm prices for pistachios 
and almonds in California.
Export sales have grown even more rapidly, re-
ﬂecting the same forces at work in other consuming 
countries combined with faster growth in U.S. produc-
tion compared with other exporters. The United States 
exported almost 41 million pounds of pistachios in the 
2002–03 crop year. Major export destinations in 2003 
were the European Union (EU) (Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, France, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg), 
which accounted for more than half of the total value 
of exports, and Canada, China, and Japan. The value of 
U.S. pistachio exports rose steadily until 1999, when 
it decreased from more than $120 million to less than 
$90 million (U.S. International Trade Commission). 
Since then, export values and volumes have been 
greater. The value of U.S. pistachio exports reached 
$135 million in 2003. Figure 2.7, which is based on the 
data shown in Appendix Table A6, shows the trends 
in allocation of U.S. production between domestic and 
export markets and changes in stocks.
In 2002, California had approximately 650 pis-
tachio producers (USDA, Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) 2003b). There was a single pistachio-
producer cooperative and 19 handlers that processed 
pistachios. About 70 percent of California pistachio 
producers produce less than 100,000 pounds per year, 
21 percent produce more than 100,000 and less than 
500,000 pounds, and about 9 percent produce more 
than 500,000 pounds. Using an average grower price 
of $1.10 per pound, this means that about 91 percent 
of California’s pistachio producers generate less than 
$550,000 in annual revenue and 9 percent generate 
more than $550,000 annually. About 85 percent of 
California pistachio handlers handle less than ten 
million pounds per year and about 15 percent handle 
more than ten million pounds annually. The largest 
handler processes about 50 percent of the industry’s 
production.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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body is authorized to collect assessments from pro-
ducers and in some cases from handlers based on 
the number of units or the value of the commodity at 
the ﬁrst-handler level. These assessments are used to 
fund authorized activities that can include quantity 
controls, market promotion, research and develop-
ment, container and pack regulations, and quality 
standards and inspection. The majority of California’s 
state marketing programs are for fruits, nuts, and veg-
etables and in most, but not all, cases the lion’s share 
of their expenditures goes to promotion.
Federal marketing orders are authorized by the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. They 
are similar to state marketing orders and the enabling 
legislation was enacted at the same time, but there are 
some differences. Federal marketing orders can cover 
a production region in more than one state while 
state marketing programs are restricted to commodi-
ties produced in individual states. Federal marketing 
orders tend to focus on quality regulations and some-
times on volume controls while state programs tend 
to focus more on research and promotion. Federal 
marketing orders are applicable to milk and speciﬁed 
groups of fruit, vegetables, and other specialty crops 
2.2. Collective Action by Growers  
to Support Pistachio Markets
Many California crops have instituted collective ac-
tion programs that are supported by federal or state 
legislation. These programs are industry-initiated, 
self-ﬁnanced, and government-mandated. Lee et al. 
documented and described the different forms of 
mandated marketing programs in California and their 
legal basis, as well as the amounts spent under each 
program and the allocations of funds to research, 
promotion, and other activities. They reported that in 
May 1995 there were 48 state marketing programs (in-
cluding marketing orders, commissions, and councils) 
and 13 federal marketing orders in effect in California 
covering about half of California’s agricultural produc-
tion and spending more than $100 million per year. 
Since then, there have been some changes in programs 
and total spending has grown, exceeding $170 million 
in 2002–03 (Carman and Alston).
State marketing orders are authorized by the 
California Marketing Act of 1937, whereas each 
commodity commission and council is authorized 
by a speciﬁc piece of legislation. Each administrative 
Figure 2.7.  Allocation of California Pistachios among Markets for 1980/81–2003/04 
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while state marketing programs are available for all 
commodities. Federal marketing orders that set stan-
dards for quality and related requirements are in place 
for many California fruits and vegetables. In addition, 
USDA provides testing and grading services for many 
commodity markets (USDA, AMS 2003a).
The California Pistachio Commission
California pistachio growers formed the California 
Pistachio Commission (CPC) in 1981 to provide sup-
port through public relations, government relations, 
marketing, and production research funded by an as-
sessment of $0.035 per pound of pistachios produced 
in California.6 Since its inception, CPC has sponsored 
research on a wide variety of cultural challenges such 
as disease and insect control, methods of increasing 
production yields, and cultivar improvement. CPC 
also publishes a quarterly industry newsletter, The 
Pistachio Perspective, which contains the latest in-
dustry-related information and articles on control of 
pests and diseases, industry events, the commission’s 
domestic and export promotion programs, and legisla-
tive issues affecting the industry.
Through USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS), CPC receives funding under the Market Ac-
cess Program (MAP) to promote California pistachio 
exports in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Thailand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 
MAP funds to the pistachio industry averaged about 
$800,000 per year during the ﬁve years ending in 2002 
(USDA, FAS 2003b). CPC also supports a number 
of additional export markets through commission-
funded programs. In 2002–03, CPC spent a total of 
almost $9 million, more than $6 million of which was 
for promotion (Carman and Alston). 
The Federal Marketing Order for  
California Pistachios
In July 2002, hearings were held in Fresno on a 
proposal to establish a federal marketing order for 
pistachios grown in California. The proposed order 
was recommended by USDA’s Agricultural Market-
ing Service and put out for comment and a grower 
vote in early 2004. The proposal was supported by 
90 percent of the growers voting and the marketing 
order is expected to be established in August 2005. 
Table 2.1 documents key events in the history of the 
establishment of the order. 
The stated objective of the program is to enhance 
grower returns through delivery of higher-quality 
pistachios to consumers.7 Hitherto, industry quality-
control practices were limited to voluntary testing for 
aﬂatoxin and other quality requirements under a mar-
keting agreement for California pistachios that was 
entered into by a number of pistachio handlers under 
authority of the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture (CDFA). That agreement was limited to is-
sues relating to blending artiﬁcially opened pistachios 
with those that opened naturally and to bleaching of 
pistachios. Under the agreement, aﬂatoxin testing 
and sampling guidelines were used only for exports 
to speciﬁed countries.
The proposed federal marketing order sets stan-
dards for the quality of pistachios produced and 
handled in California by establishing a maximum 
aﬂatoxin tolerance level, maximum limits for defects, 
a minimum size requirement, and mandatory inspec-
tion and certiﬁcation. These standards apply solely to 
pistachios marketed in the United States. An eleven-
member committee consisting of eight producers, 
two handlers, and one public member will admin-
ister the program. The program will be ﬁnanced by 
assessments on handlers of pistachios grown in the 
production area.
Aﬂatoxin is the main issue behind the marketing 
order, which states that no handler shall ship for 
domestic human consumption pistachios that ex-
ceed an aﬂatoxin level of 15 parts per billion (ppb).8 
An aflatoxin inspection certificate must cover all 
domestic pistachio shipments. The marketing order 
further outlines aflatoxin-testing procedures that 
must be completed to obtain the aﬂatoxin inspection 
6  Details on CPC’s history and activities can be found on its Web site, www.pistachios.org.
7  Details here are based on the proposed rule (USDA, AMS 2003a, pp. 45990–46033).
8  This is a tighter standard than the current maximum allowed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration of 20 ppb.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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certiﬁcate. The aim is to be able to trace every certi-
ﬁed lot of an individual handler from testing through 
shipment. Certiﬁcation of aﬂatoxin levels done by an 
accredited laboratory is supposed to certify that no lot 
of California pistachios shipped domestically exceeds 
proscribed aﬂatoxin levels.
Aﬂatoxins in Pistachios and Other Foods
Aﬂatoxicosis is poisoning that results from in-
gestion of aﬂatoxins in contaminated food or feed.9 
Aﬂatoxins are a group of structurally related toxic 
compounds produced by certain strains of the fungi 
Aspergillus ﬂavus and A. parasiticus. Under favorable 
conditions of temperature and humidity, these 
Table 2.1. History of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
  Date  Event
  1996  The California Pistachio Commission and Western Pistachio Association attempted to 
establish a federal marketing order. The attempt was terminated in 2000 due to lack 
of industry support for certain provisions.
  2000  The Proponents Committee for the federal marketing order was established as a 
consequence of renewed interest in such an order.
  2001–2002  The Proponents Committee developed a proposal that aimed to achieve an industry 
consensus and gather evidence to meet USDA criteria.
  July 23–25, 2002  A public hearing was held in Fresno, California, by USDA to receive evidence on the 
proposed marketing order from producers, handlers, and other interested parties.
  December 11, 2003  An afﬁrmative decision was declared by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and a 
referendum order was issued.
 Jan. 12–Feb. 9, 2004  The referendum was conducted among California growers.
  March 1, 2004  The referendum results were published. The marketing order was favored by voters 
representing 90 percent of the total volume of production voted in the referendum.
  April 4, 2004  The ﬁnal rule establishing a marketing order for pistachios grown in California to 
begin August 1, 2004, was published in the Federal Register.
  July 23, 2004  The start date for the marketing order was deferred to February 1, 2005.
  January 4, 2005  Implementation of quality requirements under the pistachio marketing order was 
delayed until August 1, 2005.
  August 1, 2005  All provisions of the marketing order become effective.
fungi grow on certain foods and feeds, resulting 
in production of aﬂatoxins. The most pronounced 
contaminations have been encountered in tree nuts, 
peanuts, and other oilseeds, including corn and 
cottonseed. Aﬂatoxins produce acute necrosis, cirrho-
sis, and carcinoma of the liver in a number of animal 
species and it is logical to assume that humans may 
be similarly affected. Aﬂatoxicosis in humans has been 
reported only rarely; however, cases of it are not always 
recognized. One of the most important accounts of 
aﬂatoxicosis in humans occurred in more than 150 
villages in adjacent districts of two neighboring states 
in northwest India in the fall of 1974. According to one 
report of this outbreak, 397 people were affected and 
108 people died. A ten-year follow-up of the Indian 
9  Information here is taken from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2004).Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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aﬂatoxin levels in pistachio ice cream. Karen Reinecke 
from CPC supplied various documents detailing the 
continued appearance of high aﬂatoxin levels in coun-
tries worldwide. For example, one case in Australia 
dealt with a recall of pistachios following detection 
of high aﬂatoxin levels. In February 2000, health 
ofﬁcials in Japan found high levels of aﬂatoxin in 
pistachios, which resulted in a recall of the product. 
Also in 2000, aﬂatoxin testing in France found high 
aﬂatoxin levels. 
Economic Rationale for Mandated Standards
Mandated collective action programs such as CPC 
and the proposed California pistachio marketing order 
use coercive powers of the state or federal government 
to oblige individual producers to participate and con-
tribute assessments. The programs are voluntary in 
the sense that their establishment requires support 
from a sufﬁciently large majority of producers, but 
they do not require unanimous support. And, unlike 
truly voluntary collective action programs such as co-
operatives or clubs, these programs, once established, 
are mandatory for all producers of the commodity in 
the deﬁned area.
The conventional in-principle economic justiﬁ-
cation for such use of the government’s taxing and 
regulatory powers is that there are collective goods 
within the industry—research, promotion, grade stan-
dards, packing regulations, public relations, and the 
like—that will be undersupplied otherwise.10 In prac-
tice, whether the pistachio marketing order will yield 
net beneﬁts to producers, the state, and the nation as a 
whole will depend on the nature and extent of “public 
good” or “external” costs and beneﬁts associated with 
minimum quality standards and mandatory testing for 
aﬂatoxins, along with the other provisions of the order 
and the costs of implementing the program.
Various elements of the regulations under the 
marketing order have different types of public-good 
characteristics, some more easily justified than 
others. Standardized grades and packaging have 
outbreak found that survivors fully recovered with no 
ill effects from the experience.
In rich countries, aﬂatoxin contamination in food 
rarely occurs at levels that cause acute aﬂatoxicosis 
in humans, but there have been important aﬂatoxin 
events associated with pistachios. Iranian pistachio 
imports were banned in the EU in September 1997 
because of excessive levels of aﬂatoxins in Iranian 
pistachio shipments (The Economist). The ban lasted 
nearly three months and was lifted in December 1997 
(European Commission, Food and Veterinary Ofﬁce). 
However, the demand for pistachios was affected for 
a longer period. The Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO) has presented 
data showing that imports into the EU dropped from 
102,698 metric tons in 1997 to 59,619 metric tons 
in 1998.
In 1997, an importing year that was truncated 
by the ban, Germany imported 47,494 metric tons 
of pistachios worth $175.3 million and the ﬁve-year 
average leading up to that year (1993–1997) was 
43,459 metric tons per year (FAO). In 1998, Germany 
imported only 18,937 metric tons, just 40 percent of 
the quantity in the previous year. German imports 
during the next two years were also well below 1997 
quantities—27,059 metric tons in 1999 and only 
25,090 metric tons in 2000. The value of the imports 
fell to $78.9 million, just 45 percent of the value in 
1997. This drastic and protracted reduction in imports 
after the ban was lifted points to a decrease in con-
sumption, perhaps resulting from negative publicity 
in the media. In 1999, Oeko-Test, a German consumer 
report, reported that eight of eleven samples of pis-
tachios from German supermarkets had higher than 
allowed aﬂatoxin levels and that the highest levels 
were in California pistachios (Hermes).
In the years since 1997, pistachios from several 
countries have exceeded maximum aﬂatoxin levels 
on several occasions, making headlines worldwide. 
In 2000, Germany alone produced several articles 
in national (Der Spiegel, Sueddeutsche Zeitung) and 
regional newspapers following findings of high 
10  This is the standard public-good argument for government intervention. The goods in question are public goods in the sense 
that they are nonrival and nonprice excludable, but these public-good beneﬁts are conﬁned to the producers and consumers of 
a particular commodity and are associated with consumption or production of the commodity. The collective goods could be 
provided using the general revenues of the relevant state or national government but it is likely to be fairer and more efﬁcient 
to ﬁnance their provision using a tax on the commodity with which the collective goods are associated.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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a public-good role in that they reduce transaction 
costs (e.g., see Freebairn 1967, 1973). An argument 
for quality regulation can be made where quality is 
hidden and the market can be spoiled as a result of 
distortions in incentives to provide and communicate 
information about quality (e.g., Akerlof). The public-
good element is that a consumer’s experience with 
the quality of pistachios from one supplier affects 
that consumer’s subsequent demand for pistachios 
from other suppliers as well. Especially in the case 
of a food-quality issue, a bad experience associated 
with any supplier’s pistachios will likely affect the 
whole industry. The impacts can be large and long 
lasting, but individual producers will not take these 
industrywide consequences of their actions entirely 
into account. 
Regulations over visual standards—freedom from 
blemishes or minimum size regulations, for exam-
ple—are generally less easy to justify on public-goods 
grounds since they relate to aspects of quality that are 
not hidden from consumers. Such regulations may 
provide de facto supply control by diverting some of 
the volume to nonfood uses altogether or de facto price 
discrimination by diverting a larger proportion of the 
crop to the processing market, which has a more elas-
tic demand response.11 One rationale for minimum 
quality standards for pistachios is that aﬂatoxins are 
more often found in small or damaged nuts and elimi-
nating those nuts from the market is an indirect way 
of reducing the risk of aﬂatoxins. However, these facts 
raise a question about whether the policy of direct 
testing for aﬂatoxins is effective. 
Maximum aﬂatoxin standards and inspection and 
certiﬁcation have a food-safety role, as well as an in-
dustry collective-good element, because aﬂatoxins are 
a serious, and in some cases deadly, poison. However, 
the standards proposed by the marketing order are in 
addition to and tighter than those the U.S. government 
already has in place for food safety. An industrywide 
food safety issue could arise as a result of evidence of 
death or illness associated with consumption of pista-
chios containing aﬂatoxins. As with other food scares, 
there may be consequences for demand experienced 
throughout the industry, not just by ﬁrms directly 
responsible for such incidents. 
The same type of market problem could arise with-
out a case of actual food poisoning. It could result from 
an aﬂatoxin event involving discovery of aﬂatoxins 
in excess of the 20 ppb allowed by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). Even in the absence of an 
aﬂatoxin event in pistachios, there could be adverse 
effects on the pistachio market from perceptions of 
such a threat generated by adverse publicity associat-
ing aﬂatoxins with pistachios, directly or indirectly, 
for some other reason, such as when excess amounts 
are discovered in other products in the United States 
or anywhere else in the world. Negative perceptions 
could result from adverse attention to aﬂatoxins even 
if no excess amounts were discovered. Negative conse-
quences could result from negative perceptions among 
ﬁnal consumers, who then choose not to purchase 
products; negative perceptions among market middle-
men such as retailers that then decide not to stock a 
product that might be subject to recall or lawsuits; or 
from governments that prohibit products because of 
heightened concerns over food safety. 
Perceptions of a food quality problem are not spe-
ciﬁc to individual suppliers; instead, they affect the 
industry in a collective way. Therefore, the private 
incentive to assure high quality nuts that are perceived 
as safe does not reﬂect the full industrywide or pub-
lic beneﬁt of these actions. In such cases, voluntary 
actions motivated by private incentives provide less 
safety and quality assurance than would be in the 
interest of the industry (and the general consuming 
public). In this case, all farms and ﬁrms beneﬁt from a 
stronger reputation for pistachios in general, but their 
individual actions cannot assure such a reputation 
unless the rest of the industry matches those actions. 
Individual farms and ﬁrms have private incentive to 
keep their own direct costs low and invest less in 
safety testing and quality assurance than would be 
optimal from the view of the whole market. This is a 
classic “free rider” problem where individuals cannot 
11  Alston et al. (1995) analyzed the impacts of the allocated-reserve policy applied by the Almond Board of California under a 
federal marketing order, an example of this type of supply control, which can be mimicked by use of quality regulations to divert 
some fraction of production from the market. Chalfant and Sexton analyzed an interesting example of de facto price discrimina-
tion associated with grade standards in the California prune industry.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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be precluded from sharing in beneﬁts even if they fail 
to contribute and where one individual beneﬁting 
from the better reputation does not preclude beneﬁts 
to others.12
Two characteristics of the pistachio market make 
public-good concerns particularly important in 
the context of food safety assurances and quality 
standards. First, as with many fresh fruits and nuts, 
there is little if any brand identiﬁcation with pista-
chios. Thus, a customer who has an unsatisfying 
experience with a purchase of pistachios or who 
hears negative news about the safety of consuming 
pistachios is unlikely to associate such concerns 
with a speciﬁc brand or supplier. Unlike branded, 
packaged consumer items, any negative news would 
affect not just a speciﬁc supplier but the industry at 
large. Second, many pistachio purchasers consume 
the product infrequently, purchase relatively small 
quantities, and have relatively little knowledge about 
pistachios. One would therefore expect the industry-
wide reaction to an aﬂatoxin event in pistachios to be 
large compared with more familiar foods, especially 
in the context of food safety concerns. The wholesale 
trade would be even more sensitive to an event if a 
recall were necessary.
The result of this reasoning is that the pistachio 
industry has strong in-principle reasons for acting 
collectively to assure industrywide compliance with 
quality and food-safety standards. But this is only an 
in-principle case. Whether collective action of this type 
provides net beneﬁts to the industry depends also on 
how effective the program would be in reducing either 
the likelihood of a food scare or its severity and on the 
costs of the program. 
12 Winfree and McCluskey present a formal theoretical analysis of a market for a good with a collective reputation in which they 
demonstrate a private underinvestment in the collective good.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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T
o assess the costs and beneﬁts for the various 
groups, we developed a simulation model of sup-
ply and demand for California pistachios designed 
to allow us to represent introduction of the proposed 
federal marketing order for California pistachios.
3.1. Overview of the Model
The model is used to simulate production, prices, and 
allocation among markets for California pistachios for 
50 years ahead, beginning in the year 2000. Projec-
tions are based on historical trends and we use as a 
starting point, to deﬁne parameters, average data for 
ﬁve years, 1997 through 2001, with monetary values 
expressed in real 2003 dollars. We use a stochastic 
simulation approach with yields varying over time 
to reﬂect alternate bearing and other random inﬂu-
ences. Aﬂatoxin events also occur at random. In the 
model, both the speciﬁed probability of an event and 
the severity of the demand response to a given event 
are lower with the marketing order in place. For each 
“draw” of a time series of future yields, we simulate 
the outcomes for economic variables in the industry 
with and without the marketing order; by comparing 
the two, we measure the consequences of the market-
ing order in a given draw. By considering 250 draws 
of future time paths of yields, we are able to estimate 
the effects of the marketing order on various measures 
of interest in terms of both average (or expected) 
values and the range of outcomes (or other measures 
of variability). 
Linear equations representing domestic and ex-
port demands for pistachios and storage demand are 
speciﬁed using estimates of elasticities and data on 
market shares, quantities, and prices. The market-
ing order applies solely to the domestic market. We 
assume it would affect domestic demand for pistachios 
by reducing the probability of an aﬂatoxin event and 
the severity of the demand response to a given event. 
We assume the marketing order would cause higher 
average quality in the market and provide USDA cer-
tiﬁcation about these improvements.
Introduction of the marketing order would also 
affect producer and processor costs. These additional 
costs relate mainly to aﬂatoxin testing and to meeting 
quality standards. They are represented in the analysis 
as a per-unit deduction from grower returns as though 
it were an assessment on growers.13 To provide a net 
beneﬁt, the marketing order must generate a large 
enough demand response to more than offset the ef-
fects of the assessment.
Supply in any year depends on the number of 
bearing trees and the yield per acre. Current supply 
does not depend on current price since bearing acre-
age is predetermined (we assume no tree removals in 
response to price changes over the ranges being ana-
lyzed) and yield is assumed to be insensitive to price. 
The longer-run supply response is through changes 
in bearing acreage, which are brought about through 
plantings made in response to expected future prices 
(or, more precisely, the expected net present value of 
an acre of new plantings). Nevertheless, given lags 
and the way in which we model expectations forma-
tion (described in detail later), current production is 
strictly predetermined in the current market period. 
The model is solved by equating total demand for 
California pistachios and the exogenous quantity and 
solving for price, which we do for each year with and 
without the marketing order for each scenario and for 
each of 250 random draws of the 50-year time series 
of yields. From these results, we calculate the effects 
on net returns to producers and processors and net 
costs and beneﬁts to marketers and consumers. 
3. A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF MANDATED STANDARDS  
IN THE MARKET FOR CALIFORNIA PISTACHIOS
13 Some elements of costs will be borne explicitly as an assessment while others are an implicit assessment through regulation. 
For the latter elements, the initial incidence actually will be on processors through a regulatory requirement that entails a cost 
rather than as an assessment. But we use a competitive market modeling approach in which the consequences will be the same 
regardless of whether the initial incidence is on processors or producers and we use an average estimate of the cost of compli-
ance as though it were the same across all processors. These assumptions are further justiﬁed when we recall that the elasticity 
of supply in the short run is zero. As such, all of the incidence of compliance with the regulation must fall on growers at least in 
the short run.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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In addition to random variation in yields and 
aﬂatoxin events, we allow for underlying growth in 
yields and underlying growth in demand based on 
an extrapolation of past trends. We also allow for 
the possibility that USDA certiﬁcation might lead to 
a permanent increase in demand. We conduct the 
stochastic simulations ﬁrst using our “most likely” 
selection of parameter values, for which we report 
detailed results, and then using alternative parameter 
values to examine the sensitivity of the results to as-
sumptions.
3.2. Supply, Demand, Price,  
and Market Allocation
The equations of the model are speciﬁed as linear 
forms and they are parameterized using data on initial 
values of prices and quantities, assumptions about un-
derlying proportional trends in demand and yield, and 
elasticities. The initial data on prices and quantities 
are the average actual values for 1997 through 2001 
expressed in 2003 dollars, and these values do not 
vary across alternative simulations. In recognition of 
uncertainty about values for the elasticities and trend 
growth rates, as well as about a set of base values, we 
try alternative values and examine the implications 
for ﬁndings.14
Long and sad experience reveals that it is surpris-
ingly difﬁcult to estimate useful elasticities of supply 
or demand for agricultural products and the precision 
and robustness of the estimates are often low. (We 
suspect this same statement applies to such param-
eters for supply and demand parameters for other 
products as well.) The signal-to-noise ratio is low in 
typically available time-series data, where changes 
in production or consumption attributable to prices 
are confounded with effects of other variables and 
where the econometric identiﬁcation of supply and 
demand factors is tricky. Cross-sectional variation 
does not often offer an appropriate alternative because 
price differences are more likely to reﬂect quality or 
market characteristics than an exogenous price in 
distinct markets. The estimation difﬁculties are more 
pronounced on the supply side, particularly because 
of dynamic responses that imply lags between ob-
served price changes and their realized impacts, such 
that it is necessary to model decision-making under 
uncertainty and the formation of expectations. These 
aspects are particularly pronounced for perennial 
crops where the production cycle is multi-year and 
the dynamics are long term. 
Increasingly in agricultural policy models, recogni-
tion of the limitations of econometric estimation has 
led to a greater emphasis on the use of assessments 
based on speciﬁc knowledge of the industry, indirect 
evidence from industry experts, inference from other 
commodities, and calibration approaches to avoid 
placing undue reliance on econometrically estimated 
elasticities. This is particularly true for an analysis 
that proposes to evaluate policy changes that imply 
changes in markets outside the range of historical 
experience (i.e., types that would not be well reﬂected 
in an extrapolative approach) or where we want to 
measure long-run responses, and we recognize that 
typical elasticity estimates are most likely, at best, to 
reﬂect only short- or intermediate-run responses.15
These observations are especially pertinent for 
the present context. We have in mind to simulate 
responses over a comparatively long period of time 
to policy changes that can be regarded as fully an-
ticipated and permanent in nature. For this kind of 
policy change, we seek to measure long-run responses 
of the type that generally cannot be estimated directly, 
especially for perennial crops, and we have in mind to 
simulate a policy change that goes outside the range 
of past policy change. In addition, we are dealing with 
an industry that is comparatively young and has been 
growing comparatively quickly, providing fewer than 
25 years of annual time-series data. Moreover, it can-
not be argued that the structure has been stable over 
14  A number of studies have estimated supply and demand elasticities for elements of the fruit, nut, and vegetable sector. For 
instance, see Alston et al. (1995, 1997, 1998) or Huang (1985, 1993).
15 This latter feature of econometric estimates of elasticities of supply response was discussed more than 70 years ago by Cassels 
as a likely consequence of the inherent dynamics of supply response combined with unobservable intentions and expectations on 
which they are based. The issue has been acknowledged in several reviews since then (e.g., Colman; Just and Pope; Nerlove and 
Bessler) but less often in individual supply-response studies. A further issue for policy analysts, known as the “Lucas critique,” 
arises when policy itself is embedded in the observed responses and the estimated parameters—see McDonald and Sumner.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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the period or that the market has been in long-run 
equilibrium.
We have conducted econometric analysis that 
provides some information about elasticities. None-
theless, to deﬁne the structure of the model and likely 
values for its parameters, it is necessary to use consid-
erable judgment—based on theory and knowledge of 
the industry, its markets, and technology—to augment 
and ﬁlter the limited amount of information that can 
be gleaned from econometric analysis.
Model of Investment and Supply Response
Models of supply response for perennial crops 
are reviewed in detail by Alston et al. (1995). The 
more theoretically defensible models partition the 
supply response into separate equations representing 
elements of yield per bearing acre and the number 
of bearing acres (or other measures of the stock of 
bearing trees) with adjustments to bearing acreage 
reﬂecting planting and removal of trees with a lag to 
reﬂect the time it takes for trees to mature and come 
into production. 
Based on knowledge of the pistachio industry and 
the literature, we take a fairly conventional approach 
and assume that the only supply response to price 
changes in our analysis is through plantings. In the 
case of pistachios, the trees are comparatively long-
lived and, given how relatively young the industry 
is in California, removals for replacement are not 
expected to have a substantial impact on the stock of 
trees over the period of our analysis.16 In addition, 
given the relatively modest range of economic changes 
being analyzed, we do not expect to see any removal 
response to changes in price induced by the policy. 
Most studies of supply of perennial crops do not allow 
for a removals response to prices and those that do 
allow for it usually do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant 
response; the same is true for yields. We include in the 
model a ﬁxed removal rate of 1 percent per year, which 
is consistent with recent history, and we increase this 
rate to 2 percent per year after 2015 to reﬂect increases 
in the average age of the bearing stock.17
Some of the literature has argued for a modeling 
approach based on neoclassical investment theory, 
and we have adopted an approach based on that argu-
ment (see Akiyama and Trivedi (1987) and Dorfman 
and Heien (1989) as reviewed by Alston et al. (1995)) 
combined with elements of rational expectations to 
model investments in new plantings. 
An investment in new plantings will generate a 
stream of variable proﬁts—revenue minus operating 
costs—over the life of the investment. Mathemati-
cally, 
            ∞
(1)  PVt = ∑ πt+n(1 + r)–n
              n=0
where PVt is the present value in time t of the stream 
of net revenue generated by the investment in a new 
acre of trees planted in time t; πt+k is the net return 
to the plantation in the year t+k—i.e., k years in the 
future; and r is the real discount rate.
In the beneﬁt-cost analysis, we use a real social 
rate of return of i = 4 percent per annum to discount 
the streams of beneﬁts and costs. In the growers’ 
maximization problem, however, we use a value of 
r = 5 percent per annum as the real discount rate. 
This discount rate includes a modest (1 percent) risk 
premium relative to the risk-free real rate used in 
the beneﬁt-cost analysis. In practice, we truncate the 
stream of beneﬁts at 50 years in the future, which may 
be taken as reﬂecting a view that the effective life of 
the orchard is 50 years.18 This truncation was moti-
vated by a desire to reduce the size of the large data 
16  In personal communications, Louise Ferguson (an extension specialist in the Department of Pomology at the University of 
California, Davis) (November 5, 2003) indicated that the economic life of pistachio trees is limited only by the ability of the 
branches to withstand tree shaking during harvest, which should not be a problem for the ﬁrst 50 years of life, and therefore 
she could not foresee any signiﬁcant replanting of pistachio trees for some decades to come.
17  This discrete shift could be replaced with a gradual increase from 1 percent to 2 percent, but we would not expect to see much 
change in the results.
18 The productive life expectancy of trees is more than 50 years, but we have allowed a 2 percent depreciation rate reﬂecting 
losses from disease and other causes, and trees can become obsolete for various reasons. An alternative view is that growers 
have a 50-year planning horizon and do not count beneﬁts beyond 50 years in the future. This view is not strictly consistent 
with the rational expectations approach in which the terminal value of the orchard should be included when we ﬁx the horizon 
arbitrarily at 50 years. However, when combining a 5 percent discount rate and a 2 percent depreciation rate (an effective overall 
discount rate of 7 percent), the contribution to the present value from returns beyond 50 years is quite small.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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ﬁles being generated by the simulation, but it does 
create some complexity in appropriately comparing 
streams of costs and beneﬁts given the lags between 
initial investment and the long streams of resulting 
beneﬁts. This aspect is discussed later.
The stream of net returns depends on per-acre 
yields (Y pounds per acre), the output price (P dollars 
per pound), and variable costs per acre, VC, accord-
ing to:19
                      
n (2)  πt+n = Pt+n Yt+n – VCt+n .
In this equation, Yt+n is the yield of trees planted 
in year t that will be n years old n years hence (the 
subscript refers to the future date and the superscript 
refers to the age of trees at that date). In our analysis, 
it is reasonable to assume that the variable costs per 
acre will be viewed as constant in real terms, whereas 
the output price and yields will be expected to vary. 
The expected yields from the newly planted trees 
will vary in predictable ways as the trees age, and the 
output price will vary in response to shifts in supply 
and demand, some of which are predictable based on 
information that is currently available (the current 
stock of nonbearing trees, for instance).
We use a representative-firm model in which 
the ﬁrm takes account of the effects of its planting 
decisions on both the cost of new plantings and on 
the future time path of output and prices. Assuming 
rational expectations, as described hereafter, the 
time t expectation of net revenue in time t+n can be 
written as:
                   
n (3)  Et πt+n = Et (Pt+nYt+n) – VC .
The investment decision involves comparing the ex-
pected present value of the stream of net income with 
the cost of the new plantings, which includes the cost 
of the planting material and the cost of the labor and 
capital and other inputs used to prepare the land for 
planting and to plant the trees.
In the formation of expectations of the net pres-
ent value of investment in new plantings, we use 
information on the yield-age proﬁle of trees, which 
can be treated as not varying in general shape over 
time. That is,
                
n (4)  Et Yt+n = yn Et YMt+n
where yn is the yield of an acre of trees aged n years 
as a fraction of the yield of an acre of mature bearing 
trees, YMt.
We assume that the investment cost (C) is a qua-
dratic function of the rate of new plantings (PL). 
Mathematically, 
                                              
2 (5)  Ct = c1 PLt + ½ c2 PLt .
Hence, the equations for the average and marginal 
cost of investment are 
(6)  ACt = c1 + ½ c2 PLt;  MCt = c1 + c2 PLt .
The values of the parameters of the total, average, and 
marginal cost functions (c1 and c2) are derived based 
on information from cost and return studies prepared 
by the University of California (UC) Cooperative 
Extension (Beede et al.; Kallsen et al.) on costs and 
returns for investment in pistachios combined with 
the equilibrium condition under which the expected 
present value (from the model) is equal to the current 
marginal cost of new plantings.
Then the (non-negative) quantity of new plant-
ings in time t, chosen to maximize the expected net 
present value of the investment, will be the quantity 
of new plantings such that expected present value of 
net returns will be equal to the marginal cost of the 
new plantings (per acre). That is, the quantity of new 
plantings is chosen to: 
(7)  Max Et NPVt = PLt (Et PVt – ACt) .
    PLt
19 In this approach, variable costs do not depend on yields or the age of the trees. Our inspection of cost and return studies 
prepared by the University of California Cooperative Extension (Beede et al. and Kallsen et al.) for pistachio production indicates 
that this is a reasonable approximation for bearing trees regardless of their age. We apply a different approach for nonbearing 
trees, for which costs are incurred but no revenue is obtained. In practice, we treat all costs incurred during the nonbearing 
phase as an element of the initial investment in a new planting.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for a maximum 
is that marginal beneﬁt (per acre) equals marginal 
cost:
(8)  Et PVt = MCt .
In these equations, planting decisions are based 
on expectations of prices, yields, and so on over the 
indeﬁnite future. Inherent in these expectations is 
knowledge not only of the parameters of the supply 
side of the model—including yield relationships and 
the dynamics of the stock of bearing trees as well as the 
determinants of plantings represented in Equations 
(1) through (7)—but also knowledge of the parameters 
of the demand side. It is not practicable to solve our 
speciﬁc structure analytically for the supply-response 
model implied by rational expectations. Instead, we 
use an iterative numerical simulation process. Before 
we describe that process, we elaborate on the other 
elements of the model.
Bearing Acreage
Bearing acreage evolves according to 
(9)  Bt = (1 – ft) Bt–1 + PLt–5
where Bt is the bearing acreage in year t, which is 
equal to the value in the previous year less the amount 
removed in that year, which is deﬁned by the pro-
portional removal rate ft (remember, we assume ft is 
0.01 for years up to 2015 and 0.02 thereafter) plus an 
increment equal to the number of trees planted in the 
year ﬁve years previously. 
Yield per Bearing Acre
Yields per bearing acre of mature trees vary over 
time, reﬂecting both the alternate bearing habit of pis-
tachios and the inﬂuence of other random variables. 
Yields also trend up to reﬂect technological improve-
ments. To capture these characteristics, we use a trend 
model of the following form:
(10)  YMt+n = (1 + g)n YMt (1 + ut+n)
where YMt+n is the projected yield per mature bearing 
acre in year t+n, which is equal to the value in the base 
year, YMt, scaled up by exponential growth at a rate g 
and adjusted by an annual proportional shock, ut+n.
The values for ut+n are obtained by ﬁrst computing 
the past values of year-to-year variations around trend 
yields. We extend that series to a length of 100 obser-
vations by replicating the sequence and then draw a 
series of 50 by selecting a starting point at random 
within the 100 observations. This series represents 
one 50-year sequence of random shocks that, when 
combined with Equation (10), allows us to generate 
a single “future” of yields over 50 years. Alternative 
futures are generated by drawing alternative starting 
points. We generate and use a total of 250 such futures 
in the simulation models.
The yield per bearing acre in year t, Yt, is also 
affected by the age structure of the population of 
mature and immature bearing trees. In the formation 
of expectations of the net present value of investment 
in new plantings, we use information on the yield-age 
proﬁle of trees, which can be treated as not varying in 
general shape over time. That is,
(11) 
where, as noted, yn is the yield of an acre of trees aged 
n years as a fraction of the yield of an acre of mature 
bearing trees.
Production
Production is simply the product of yield per bear-
ing acre from Equation (11) and the number of bearing 
acres from Equation (9):
(12)  Qt = Yt × Bt .
Demand Equations
Annual demand consists of two distinct markets, 
the domestic and the export market, which are treated 
differently by the marketing order. Demand also in-
cludes demand for changes in stocks. We specify linear 
equations for quantities demanded on the domestic 
market (DDt), on the export market (DEt), and for Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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storage (DSt) t years in the future as a function of the 
price of pistachios (Pt) in that year as follows:
  DDt = (d0 – d1 Pt)(1 + d)t
(13)  DEt = (e0 – e1 Pt)(1 + e)t .
  DSt = (s0 – s1 Pt)(1 + s)t
Values for the slope and intercept parameters for each 
of these equations are estimated using elasticities and 
initial values for prices and quantities in the base year 
using ﬁve-year averages (1997–2001). Values for the 
growth rate parameters (d, e, and s) were chosen to re-
ﬂect underlying growth rates in demand (reﬂecting the 
inﬂuence of growth in population, per capita income, 
other demographic variables, and other trend factors 
such as prices of other goods and preferences). Initial 
values for these were set at 3.6 percent per annum in 
each case in view of past trends in consumption and 
after allowing for the effects of trends in prices.
Values for the demand elasticities are based 
on a combination of econometric estimates in the 
literature, our own econometric estimations, and 
our judgment based on knowledge of the pistachio 
industry and other agricultural industries. Lewis 
conducted a statistical analysis of pistachio demand 
response and found elasticity values ranging from 
–1.59 to –2.31 for export demand and from –1.14 to 
–1.66 for domestic demand. We estimated models of 
demand for U.S. pistachios in aggregate and for U.S. 
consumption and obtained some reasonable results 
and plausible elasticities. In a range of speciﬁcations, 
we estimate the overall elasticity as about –2 and the 
domestic elasticity as about –1. These estimates are 
consistent with elasticities of demand for exports and 
storage of about –3, which are plausible.
The storage model warrants some brief elabo-
ration. Pistachios may be stored from one year to 
the next as a speculative response to accommodate 
alternate bearing and other somewhat predictable 
supply and demand shocks or for other purposes that 
ﬁt under the rubric “convenience yield.” Storage re-
sponse is important in our context because increased 
storage may be an important mechanism by which 
the industry can absorb a temporary demand shock. 
Our representation of storage response is necessarily 
simple, but it is a better option than treating storage 
as exogenous and not relevant to the analysis of the 
consequences of a demand shock.
In specifying the simple linear model of demand 
for stocks, we opt not to apply any speciﬁc formal 
model of storage behavior, such as a model based on 
rational expectations or some form of an efﬁcient-
markets hypothesis. In our speciﬁcation, the demand 
for stocks slopes down such that current stocks will 
be greater when the current price is lower—a view that 
is consistent with various models of storage behavior 
and its motivations. Our limited econometric analysis 
gave some support to this view prior to implementa-
tion of the simulation analysis, and further support 
can be taken from a consideration of the results of the 
simulations as documented in Appendix Table A7.
Using the mean of the simulated values in the base-
line scenario (discussed in Section 4), we compute the 
change in stocks each year and, using the simulated 
prices, the value of the change in stocks each year. This 
can be seen as the gross annual proﬁt from speculative 
stockholding; computing net proﬁts would require 
deductions for costs of storage, losses in storage, 
and “in and out” charges, but we do not have data on 
these costs. We compute the net present value of these 
gross stock trading proﬁts using a real discount rate 
of 5 percent per annum (as used for other elements 
of the producer problem) as –$114.7 million; using a 
discount rate of 10 percent instead, the present value 
is –$18 million. That is, the storage behavior predicted 
by the model involves a loss to producers (storers). 
Over the 50-year horizon, the model predicts that a 
relatively constant share, about 24 percent of the crop, 
will be stored from year to year and that the gross loss 
from storage (not counting storage costs and so on) 
is worth about 1.3 percent of the value of the crop. 
Essentially, this results from the long-term trend of 
falling prices such that storage is, on average, a losing 
proposition. The fact that relatively more is stored in 
high-output (low-price) years and relatively less in 
low-output (high-price) years mitigates but does not 
eliminate the fundamental trend.
We compared this pattern with the actual storage 
behavior in the previous period, 1979–2001. To put 
the ﬁgures on an equal footing, we compared those 
20 years with the ﬁrst 20 years in the simulation, 
2000–2020. The results in Appendix Table A7 are Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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reassuring. In the actual data, stocks as a share of pro-
duction averaged 37 percent between 1979 and 2001 
(compared with a simulated 24 percent between 2000 
and 2020); the actual quantity stored was somewhat 
more volatile than the simulated quantity stored. Us-
ing a 5 percent discount rate, the present value in 1979 
of gross stock trading losses between 1979 and 2001 
was $50 million (compared with a simulated present 
value in 2000 of stock trading losses for 2000–2020 
of $49 million), and these actual losses were incurred 
in a signiﬁcantly smaller industry than that simulated 
over the subsequent period. The gross characteristics 
of the simulated storage behavior are consistent with 
those of the past: a signiﬁcant share of production 
carried over from one year to the next and signiﬁcant 
trading losses on stored pistachios. Presumably these 
losses are incurred in order to earn some other market 
advantage, such as ability to meet unexpected demand 
or other elements of “convenience yield.”
Market Equilibrium 
The sum of the three elements of demand repre-
sents the total demand (i.e., Dt = DDt + DEt + DSt), 
which can be solved for price to obtain the inverse 
demand equation as follows:
    d0 (1 + d)t + e0 (1 + e)t + s0 (1 + s)t – Qt (14)  Pt = ________________________________ . 
        d1 (1 + d)t + e1 (1 + e)t + s1 (1 + s)t
Then, substituting for Qt from Equation (12), which 
depends on the stock of bearing trees from Equa-
tion (9) and realization of the stochastic yields from 
Equations (10) and (11), we can solve for the market 
clearing price. 
Model Solution Procedure
The model solution procedure followed an iterative 
recursive process for a given policy scenario. First, 
a set of starting values was chosen for the stream 
of expected net present values per acre. The set of 
starting values implies a stream of plantings (which 
do not depend on the unpredictable, stochastic ele-
ments of yields) over the 50-year planning horizon 
of 2000–2050. Then, using that stream of plantings, 
we projected the stream of bearing acreage over the 
next 100 years.20 Combining the stream of projected 
bearing acreage with each of the 250 streams of yield 
futures, we computed the corresponding 250 future 
streams of annual gross and net revenues both in total 
and per acre. From these future streams, we computed 
the average, or expected, stream and then the expected 
present value of investments for each of the 50 years, 
2000–2050. Next, we used these solutions to replace 
the starting values and repeated the process. The 
process was iterated until the solution did not change 
appreciably—that is, the expected stream of revenue 
in total and per acre used to generate the stream of 
plantings was equivalent to the expected stream of 
revenue in total and per acre implied by the stream 
of plantings. It is in this sense that the model entails 
rational expectations. The same procedure was also 
used with alternative parameterizations (but the same 
yield draws) to simulate the market under alternative 
policy scenarios.
3.3. Price, Quantity, and  
Economic-Welfare Impacts
Producer beneﬁts associated with the policy are com-
puted (as differences compared with a no-policy base) 
for each scenario and for each year of the simulation as 
the change in proﬁt or producer surplus. The supply 
response was derived from maximization of the ex-
pected net present value of proﬁts, and we computed 
the expected (or average) net present value of pro-
ducer net returns as an element of the model solution 
procedure. This requires two modiﬁcations before it 
can be used as the measure of producer beneﬁts in 
the social beneﬁt-cost calculus. The ﬁrst modiﬁcation 
is to the discount rate. For the producer optimization, 
we incorporated an allowance for risk and used a dis-
count rate of 5 percent per annum. For the aggregate 
beneﬁt-cost analysis, we used a smaller discount rate 
of 4 percent, leaving out the risk premium.
The second modiﬁcation is made because we opted 
to evaluate the beneﬁts and costs of the marketing 
order over the 2000–2050 50-year horizon (this is 
20 Plantings in year 2050 depend on expected returns over 2051–2100 and hence the 50-year planning horizon entails projections 
over 100 years. In practice, we solved the model for the ﬁrst 50 years and then projected the values for the 50th year forward for 
an additional 50 years as though a steady-state solution had been reached in year 50.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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implied by the decision to truncate the stream of ben-
eﬁts using that horizon). The decision to truncate the 
beneﬁts at 2050 implies making an adjustment to the 
stream of costs of new plantings to make it comparable 
to the stream of beneﬁts. For instance, the stream of 
costs includes the costs of plantings made during 
the last six years of the simulation even though they 
cannot have generated any beneﬁts within the 50-year 
horizon. Those costs are associated with an investment 
that will yield beneﬁts that will be realized after the 
end of the 50 years and it is therefore inappropriate to 
include them in the beneﬁt-cost calculation. Similarly, 
trees planted in the last 20 years of the 50-year horizon 
will generate most of their beneﬁts after the end of the 
50-year period, and any tree planted after 2001 will 
have some of its beneﬁts accruing after 2050. Hence, 
we discounted the costs of planting and progressively 
more so for later plantings. To do this, we developed 
and applied a procedure to apportion planting costs 
incurred in each year of the simulation according to 
the fraction of the total expected beneﬁts (measured in 
present value of beneﬁts in 2000) from that planting 
that would accrue prior to 2050.21
Annual domestic consumer beneﬁts were com-
puted as changes in Marshallian consumer surplus 
(the area behind the domestic demand curve), reﬂect-
ing the effects of both price changes and shifts in the 
demand. Annual national beneﬁts are equal to the 
sum of producer and consumer beneﬁts.
The annual producer, consumer, and national 
benefits were discounted back and expressed in 
present-value terms. The producer beneﬁt-cost ratio 
is computed as the ratio of the present value of pro-
ducer net beneﬁts divided by the present value of the 
producer incidence of the assessment to ﬁnance the 
policy. Another index of the economic impact of the 
policy is the national beneﬁt-cost ratio, which is com-
puted as the present value of national beneﬁts divided 
by the present value of the cost of the program. (The 
cost of the program includes the cost of both the as-
sessment to ﬁnance the program and other costs of 
compliance with the program, both of which are rep-
resented in the model as though they were included 
in the assessment, as discussed in the next section.) 
We express the beneﬁt-cost ratios for both producers 
and the nation as net beneﬁts per unit cost. A more 
conventional beneﬁt-cost ratio, which expresses gross 
beneﬁts per unit cost, can be obtained by adding one 
to the ratios we report.
3.4. Representation of Effects  
of the Marketing Order
The marketing order imposes regulations that entail 
costs of compliance, borne in the ﬁrst instance by 
processors, and other costs that are to be ﬁnanced by 
an assessment on processors. The provisions of the 
marketing order are designed to improve marketing 
conditions and increase the demand for pistachios on 
average and thereby to provide beneﬁts to the industry 
that will more than offset the cost of compliance. The 
potential increases in demand, on average relative to 
a scenario without a marketing order, include the ef-
fects of (1) a reduced probability of a negative shock 
to demand associated with an aﬂatoxin event and a 
reduction in the size of the negative shock associated 
with a given event, and (2) an increase in demand in 
every year owing to greater consumer (and buyer) 
conﬁdence in the product associated with USDA test-
ing and certiﬁcation. In this section, we discuss these 
two demand elements, but ﬁrst we turn to the cost of 
compliance they are meant to offset.
Cost of Testing and Other Compliance Issues
The quantitative economic analysis requires 
information on the costs of aflatoxin testing and 
compliance with other quality standards as regulated 
under the marketing order. The initial incidence of 
these additional costs will be on the processing sec-
tor. Depending on their current level of testing and 
other characteristics, processing ﬁrms face different 
costs of complying with the proposed standards 
under the marketing order—in essence, the cost of 
aﬂatoxin testing of pistachios destined for the do-
mestic market and of meeting quality standards. A 
21 Using discounting procedures, we computed the fraction of the total net present value of beneﬁts from an investment in a 
new planting accruing before (and the fraction that will accrue after) any given number of years in the future (for instance, for 
up to six years into the future, the fractions will be zero and one). Hence, we estimated the fraction of total expected beneﬁts 
that will accrue within the period 2000 through 2050 and the fraction that will accrue after 2050.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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telephone conference with the seven major processors 
in California provided data on the cost that various 
processors in the California pistachio industry would 
face under the proposed marketing order (Pistachio 
Processor Group). In his testimony at the July 2002 
hearings, Sumner described in detail how to estimate 
these costs for three different types of processors 
depending on their current testing practices and the 
size of their processing operations and based on labor 
requirements and wage rates for inspectors, lot sizes, 
and various other factors. The resulting estimate of 
the direct per-unit cost of compliance was a weighted 
average (across the different types of processors) of 
$0.00525 per pound on the two-thirds of production 
to which the proposed marketing-order rules would 
apply. This ﬁgure seems to be a consensus estimate 
in the industry.22 The weighted cost of compliance 
applied across all of California’s pistachio produc-
tion is $0.0035 per pound. These ﬁgures are based 
on an assumption that few undersized pistachios 
are currently sold in the standard market such that 
implementation of the other features of the marketing 
order would not have a signiﬁcant impact on the total 
quantity available to the domestic market.23
Effects on the Probability of an Aﬂatoxin Event 
and its Consequences
Direct evidence does not exist on the probability of 
an aﬂatoxin event that would cause a major negative 
shock to demand when it occurred or on the likely 
severity of the shock. We assume that increased af-
latoxin testing would reduce the probability of such 
an event and could reduce the severity of the shock 
as well, but, again, we have no direct quantitative 
evidence on the relevant magnitudes. To calibrate 
the potential effects of a pistachio food scare, we use 
information from other produce-related food scares 
in the United States along with information from 
an event involving pistachios in Germany, and we 
conduct some sensitivity analysis in which we vary 
the relevant parameters.
Many produce-related food scares have occurred, 
and these give some guidance about the potential size 
and duration of the response to an aﬂatoxin event 
in pistachios. For the period from 1990 to 1999, the 
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) lists 55 
cases in the United States alone. A recent produce-re-
lated food scare involved cantaloupes and Salmonella 
in 2000, 2001, and 2002. Because of potential health 
risks stemming from Salmonella that had infected sev-
eral people in the United States and Canada, certain 
cantaloupe brands were recalled nationwide (U.S. FDA 
2003). In 1996, the California strawberry industry lost 
an estimated 5 percent in total revenue because of a 
Cyclospora scare (details can be found in Calvin). An 
earlier, well-known event demonstrating the public’s 
sensitivity toward food quality was the Alar scare in 
apples in 1989. A television broadcast reported that 
Alar was used in apple production and that it was the 
“most cancer-causing substance in the food supply.” 
Apple demand dropped dramatically overnight and 
apple growers suffered losses estimated at hundreds 
of millions of dollars (details can be found in van 
Ravenswaay and Hoehn).24 The American Council on 
Science and Health (ACSH) reported that the effects 
from the scare could still be felt even ﬁve years later 
and that the market had not fully recovered.
Some direct evidence is available on the market 
response to an aﬂatoxin event in pistachios but not 
for an event in the United States. As described earlier, 
the EU banned pistachio imports for three months 
in the last quarter of 1997 because of aﬂatoxins. 
After the ban was lifted, German imports were sub-
stantially reduced—estimated in the range of 40 to 
50 percent—over the next three years. The pistachio 
market is relatively small and other nuts and snack 
foods are likely to be close substitutes for pistachios. 
This may be why the losses for pistachios in the EU 
market were larger than observed in some other food 
22 The Federal Register (USDA, AMS 2003a, p. 46017) reports that “The average cost of compliance, as identiﬁed by several wit-
nesses and reiterated in Dr. Sumner’s analysis, is approximately one half cent per pound of domestic pistachio production, or 
$0.00525 per pound.”
23 In any event, under the marketing order, undersized pistachios could still be diverted to the export market and so the 
consequences of this element of the regulations for prices, quantities, and values would be negligible.
24 Additional studies of the demand impact of food safety events and information on demand can be found in Smith, van 
Ravenswaay, and Thompson; Brown and Schrader; Richards and Patterson; and Piggot and Marsh.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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scares in the United States, but the differences also 
may reflect some differences between the United 
States and other countries—in terms of institutions 
and consumer behavior—that mean their responses 
would be different.
Taking a conservative approach, we assume that 
an aﬂatoxin event in the domestic market for U.S. pis-
tachios in year t would cause a 30 percent reduction 
in demand in the year of the event (i.e., δt = 0.3). The 
German evidence suggests that the negative demand 
effects from a single aﬂatoxin event would continue 
to affect demand for several years. In the model, the 
negative demand shock decays at a rate of 30 percent 
per year (i.e., δt+n = 0.7n δt).
Aﬂatoxin events do not happen every year, but the 
market always faces some probability of a negative 
food scare. The proposed marketing order cannot 
eliminate the chance of a food scare associated with 
aﬂatoxin in pistachios, but it does have provisions 
that make such an event less likely. The beneﬁt from 
additional testing is a reduction of the probability of an 
aﬂatoxin event or food scare. For the current base case 
of no mandatory testing, we use an annual probability 
of 4 percent for an outbreak that affects demand as 
previously speciﬁed. We assume that, with mandatory 
testing, the chance of an aﬂatoxin outbreak falls to 2 
percent (Sumner). We further assume that any events 
that do occur will have smaller effects on demand. We 
assume an initial downward shock of 15 percent with 
the marketing order rather than the 30 percent when 
no marketing order is present.
Effects on Consumer and Buyer Conﬁdence
The demand for pistachios could be higher as a 
result of ofﬁcial USDA certiﬁcation ensuring a good 
quality product. Many agricultural products take 
advantage of USDA grading and other services (USDA, 
AMS 2003a). Buyers for major food outlets are famil-
iar with USDA standards, as are many consumers. In 
general, USDA’s standard-setting is thought to convey 
a positive beneﬁt in a market as reﬂected by use of 
this claim in product promotion, labels, and displays. 
We are not aware, however, of empirical evidence of 
the magnitude of the impact of certiﬁcation. Here, 
we use a small increase in demand to reﬂect higher 
buyer conﬁdence in pistachios due solely to USDA’s 
participation in the standards process.
In addition, but similarly, demand for pistachios 
will be greater with mandatory minimum quality stan-
dards and better buyer perceptions of safety. These 
standards will reﬂect well on the product as a whole 
and shift out demand for all pistachios because buyers 
will perceive a lower probability of acquiring low-
quality shipments. This demand effect also has two 
aspects. The ﬁrst is the general notion that buyers are 
willing to pay more for higher-quality nuts. Second, 
the minimum quality standard assures buyers that 
they have a smaller chance of a low-quality shipment. 
This effect relies on more information being available 
to buyers that all pistachios from the marketing-order 
area meet minimum standards. One of the provisions 
under the proposed marketing order prohibits sales 
of inferior pistachios. Although these represent a tiny 
fraction of total production, removing them from the 
market altogether will result in an increase in the 
general quality of pistachios, albeit a small one.
To reﬂect both these elements in the simulations, 
we allow for a small increase in demand in every year 
relative to the base case in response to introduction of 
the marketing order: an increase in U.S. consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for pistachios equal to 1 cent per 
pound (about 1 percent of recent prices).Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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T
he stochastic model was used to simulate the key 
economic variables in the U.S. pistachio industry 
over 250 equally likely random futures. To estimate 
the impact of the marketing order, we computed and 
compared a pair of simulations (i.e., one with and one 
without the marketing order) for each of a number of 
different scenarios.
The pair of simulations with the most plausible 
set of model parameters is referred to as the “base-
line scenario.” The baseline scenario is presented in 
some detail in Section 4.1, where we describe both 
the dynamic and stochastic impacts of the market-
ing order. In Section 4.2, the results of the sensitivity 
analysis are presented. In this analysis, the baseline 
scenario is compared to a number of other scenarios 
to determine how key results are affected by changes 
in parameters and other modeling assumptions. The 
sensitivity analysis also provides many comparative 
dynamic results that further illustrate some of the key 
economic relationships captured by the model.
4.1. Baseline Scenario and Results
The baseline scenario compares future simulations of 
the pistachio industry with and without the marketing 
order. Given that the baseline scenario is built on our 
most likely parameter values and modeling assump-
tions, it provides our best estimates of the future path 
of the industry and how this future will most likely be 
affected by the marketing order.
Describing the output for a scenario is challenging 
given that the dynamic and stochastic nature of the 
modeling process results in a great many numbers. 
For any given future, the model determines a market 
clearing price, bearing acres, acres planted, yield, 
production, domestic quantity demanded, export 
quantity demanded, ending stocks, revenue, and 
consumer surplus for each year of the simulation. 
To capture the effects of random yield variability 
and aﬂatoxin-related demand shocks, the stream of 
simulated equilibrium values was calculated for a set 
of 250 equally likely futures that differed in terms of 
values for randomly generated yields and aﬂatoxin 
shocks. Finally, for each future in a given scenario, 
to simulate the impact of the marketing order, a pair 
of simulations with and without the marketing order 
was run. Hence, for a given scenario, each simulated 
variable of interest has a 50-year time path with a 
random distribution in each period that is affected by 
the marketing order. In reading the summary statistics 
and information on average impacts that follow, it 
is important to keep this time path and the random 
nature of the variables in mind.
The average production and average number of 
bearing acres for each year in the baseline scenario 
are charted in Figure 4.1 and average prices for each 
year (among other things) are charted in Figure 4.2. 
The simulation is consistent with the history of the 
pistachio industry in California, which has been 
characterized by growth in bearing acres and yields 
that has been accompanied by declining real prices. 
Despite some supply response to lower prices, bear-
ing acres and production continue to grow at a pace 
that exceeds the growth in demand, resulting in a 
continued general decline in prices.
The average prices, production, and bearing acres 
shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are average values from 
the 250 simulated, equally likely futures. The time 
path in any given random future is more subject to 
yield and demand variability. Figure 4.2 compares 
the average prices reported previously to simulated 
prices in one particular random future. The year-to-
year variability in prices of the single future, which 
is driven by variable yields, is much greater than the 
variability of the average shown in Figure 4.2 and 
more consistent with historical variability, which is 
shown in Figure 2.3. The top and bottom lines in 
Figure 4.2 plot the ninety-ﬁfth highest and the ﬁfth 
highest price in the 100 baseline simulations, clearly 
illustrating the range of prices generated for each year 
of the stochastic simulation.
Demand shocks related to random aﬂatoxin events 
were also simulated in the baseline scenario. The de-
mand shock was modeled as a 30 percent contraction 
in domestic demand and a 6.6 percent reduction in 
foreign demand (a 30 percent shock applied to half 
of the EU market based on an EU quantity that is 
43 percent of U.S. exports—30 percent × 0.215 = 6.6 
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percent). In the baseline scenario (without a market-
ing order), we assumed a 4 percent probability of such 
an event in any given year. Given the large year-to-year 
variability in yields and prices in a simulated future, 
it is difﬁcult to see the impact of a simulated aﬂatoxin 
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demand shock in any particular future. In Figure 4.3, 
the impact of a single demand shock in year 25 is 
isolated by removing the effects of yield variability. 
As shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3, the demand 
shock results in a price decrease of 7 percent while the Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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4.2. To summarize the effects of the marketing order 
over the 50-year simulation, we report average effects 
over the 50 years for some variables and for others 
we report the net present value in 2004 of the effects 
over the 50 years. In the baseline scenario, over the 
50-year horizon and relative to a no-policy base, the 
policy modestly increases the average return to grow-
ers, along with the average number of bearing acres 
Table 4.1. Domestic and Export Demand and Price 
Effects of an Aﬂatoxin Event in 2025
    Percent Change in
  Domestic  Export 
Year  Demand  Demand  Price
2024  0.00  0.00  0.00
2025  –10.96  7.92  –6.99
2026  –6.71  7.66  –6.35
2027  –4.47  5.69  –4.76
2028  –3.06  3.99  –3.42
2029  –2.13  2.76  –2.43
2030  –1.48  1.91  –1.72
2031  –1.03  1.32  –1.23
2032  –0.72  0.91  –0.87
2033  –0.50  0.63  –0.62
2034  –0.35  0.44  –0.44
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quantity consumed domestically falls by 11 percent 
and the quantity exported increases by 7.9 percent. In 
the years following the shock, the effects continue but 
diminish gradually, reﬂecting the decay in the demand 
shock caused by the aﬂatoxin event.
The impact of the marketing order in the baseline 
scenario was estimated by comparing the baseline 
simulation with a marketing order to the previously 
reported baseline simulation without a marketing 
order. In the case of the marketing order, the annual 
probability of an aﬂatoxin event was reduced from 4 
percent to 2 percent and the demand impact of such 
an event was assumed to be half as large (i.e., an initial 
drop of 15 percent in demand versus 30 percent ap-
plied to both the domestic market and relevant export 
markets). In addition to this beneﬁt, the marketing 
order was assumed to increase domestic consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for pistachios by 1 cent per pound. 
The cost of compliance with the marketing order, 
0.525 cents per pound consumed domestically, is 
reﬂected as a reduction in the price to growers from 
domestic sales. Finally, as described in Section 3, we 
assumed that producers will anticipate the beneﬁts 
of the marketing order and the planting responses of 
their fellow growers.
The impacts of the marketing order in the baseline 
scenario are summarized in the ﬁrst column of Table Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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(by 1,669 acres) and production (by 8.62 million 
pounds per year).25 These increases in production 
are associated generally with an increase in domestic 
consumption (by 9.92 million pounds per year) and 
decreases in both exports (by 1.25 million pounds per 
year) and stocks (by 1.30 million pounds per year). 
These averages mask the fact that, as noted previously, 
the effects on some of these variables change over 
time both because of trends (such as the production 
response to the policy, shifts in the incidence, and 
increases with time, as opposed to the domestic de-
mand response, which begins immediately) and from 
year to year (through the interaction of policy-induced 
changes in bearing acreage and variable yields). This 
is true in particular for the effects of the policy on 
exports—the small average effects reﬂect negative im-
pacts in some years, especially initially, and positive 
impacts in others, especially in later years.
The marketing order increases grower price and 
revenue per acre by increasing consumer conﬁdence 
and reducing the odds and the impact of an aﬂatoxin 
event. As shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the dynamics 
of the consequences are complicated because of the 
dynamics of supply response to price. The impact 
on revenue is greatest in the ﬁrst few years after 
introduction of the marketing order because supply is 
unaffected for this period of time. As shown in Figure 
4.6, the increase in revenue per acre eventually causes 
an increase in the time path of bearing acres. The 
increase in bearing acres results in increased produc-
tion, driving down prices and revenue per acre and 
dissipating the beneﬁts for producers. Consumers 
gain initially from improved food safety and these 
beneﬁts are then augmented by subsequent reductions 
in prices resulting from the increases in production 
(Figure 4.7).
The net beneﬁts from the policy—reﬂecting the 
consequences of both the assessment and regulations 
and the demand and supply responses to them—are 
expressed as present values (in 2004) of changes in 
economic surplus accruing to different groups. Over 
the 50-year horizon, these net beneﬁts include $75.3 
million to domestic producers and $115.9 million 
to domestic consumers, yielding a total national net 
beneﬁt of $191.3 million.26 From a global perspective, 
the U.S. net beneﬁts are slightly offset by net losses in 
foreigner surplus (the “consumer surplus” measured 
off the demand for U.S. exports) worth $32.6 million, 
leaving global net beneﬁts with a present value in 2004 
equal to $158.7 million.27
We also estimated the total cost of the policy (in 
terms of expenditures incurred by processors in 
compliance), which has a present value in 2004 of 
$32.7 million. The initial incidence of this cost is on 
processors, but the incidence is redistributed over time 
through supply and demand responses. To evaluate 
the incidence of the compliance cost, we ran a simula-
tion of the costs alone. Column 2 in Table 4.2 shows 
the impact of the imposition of a compliance cost of 
0.525 cents per pound at the processing stage without 
any other impacts of the marketing order. In present-
value terms, the global cost of $31.7 million is lower 
than the national cost of $35 million because taxing 
domestic consumption confers a beneﬁt of $4 million 
to foreign “consumers.” Of the total cost, producers 
pay $7.5 million. Hence, 24 percent of the cost is 
borne by growers, 76 percent by domestic and foreign 
consumers combined, and 89 percent by domestic 
consumers (foreign consumers are net beneﬁciaries 
of a tax on domestic consumers). 
We applied these same percentages to apportion 
the incidence of the compliance costs in the context 
25 Note that the policy also marginally reduces the annual standard deviation in prices.
26 On 78,000 bearing acres in 2001, the producer beneﬁt is worth $2,120 per acre, but the beneﬁts would not be conﬁned to 
these acres.
27 The positive effect on export quantity seems to contradict the higher average price and the reduction in foreign “consumer” 
surplus associated with the policy. The effect on foreign “consumer” surplus is complicated. First, there are some beneﬁts to 
foreigners from the policy because in the baseline there is a spillover of an aﬂatoxin event from U.S. demand to foreign demand 
and the policy-induced reduction in probability and severity of an aﬂatoxin event applies to export markets as well as domestically. 
These beneﬁts are offset at least somewhat by larger domestic demand responses, which drive up prices, especially in the early 
years; in later years, those effects in turn are offset at least somewhat by the consequences of U.S. supply response to the policy. 
The beneﬁts to foreigners are greater in the earlier years and, given discounting, the net present value is negative even though 
the average effect on quantity of exports, undiscounted, is slightly positive.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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Table 4.2. Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis: Baseline Scenario
  Baseline  Cost Only  High Impact  Low Impact 
  1  2  3  4
Consequences of the Marketing Order
Induced Changes in Average of Annual Values, 2000–2050
Bearing Area (acres)  1,669.30  –144.80  2,501.90  1,159.00
Production (million lbs)  8.62  –0.75  12.97  5.97
U.S. Consumption (million lbs)  9.92  –1.12  14.76  6.87
Exports (million lbs)  –1.25  0.37  –1.73  –0.87
Stocks (million lbs)  –1.30  0.18  –1.98  –0.86
New Plantings (acres)  125.70  –10.00  186.10  91.40
Induced Changes in Final Values in 2050
Bearing Area in 2050 (acres)  3,605.50  –288.10  5,385.40  2,615.40
Stocks in 2050 (million lbs)  –2.31  0.19  –3.31  –1.76
Production in 2050 (million lbs)  25.95  –2.11  38.92  18.64
Domestic Consumption in 2050 (million lbs)  26.47  –2.59  38.69  19.60
Exports in 2050 (million lbs)  0.30  0.50  1.16  –0.14
Consequences over 50-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  32.67  31.72  31.49  33.66
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  115.93  –27.45  178.73  75.18
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –32.57  4.00  –48.55  –21.24
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  75.33  –7.54  115.45  48.20
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  191.26  –35.04  294.20  123.38
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios over 50-Year Horizon
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.90  –1.10  9.30  3.70
Grower Share of Costs  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  9.60  –1.00  15.20  6.00
Consequences over 20-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  13.02  12.67  12.09  13.90
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  33.76  –10.19  48.97  22.14
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –20.97  2.40  –28.79  –14.40
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  37.99  –4.15  53.22  25.42
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  71.76  –14.34  102.19  47.57
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios over 20-Year Horizon
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.50  –1.10  8.50  3.40
Grower Share of Costs  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  8.90  –1.00  13.50  6.00Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Figure 4.4.  Estimated Impact of the Marketing Order on Grower Prices, 2000–2050
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Figure 4.5.  Estimated Impact of the Marketing Order on Net Revenue per Bearing Acre, 2000–2050
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Figure 4.6.  Estimated Impact of the Marketing Order on Bearing Acres, 2000–2050
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Figure 4.7.  Estimated Impact of the Marketing Order on Consumer Surplus, 2000–2050
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of the marketing order with a range of parameter 
values. We divided each measure of net beneﬁts by 
the corresponding measure of the incidence of the 
costs and computed beneﬁt-cost ratios for domestic 
producers (9.6), the United States (5.9), and the world 
(4.9). (Recall that these ratios are the net beneﬁts 
to the group in question divided by the cost to that 
group associated with compliance with the marketing 
order’s regulations. Sometimes beneﬁt-cost ratios are 
deﬁned as gross beneﬁts per dollar of costs, which can 
be computed by adding 1 to the measures here based 
on net beneﬁts per dollar of costs.)
In addition to the beneﬁt-cost ratios over the 50-
year horizon, we computed beneﬁts and cost ratios 
over a 20-year horizon using the results from the ﬁrst 
20 years of the 50-year simulation of the industry 
response to the policy. This was done in response to 
a suggestion from a reviewer. As can be seen at the 
bottom of Table 4.2, the beneﬁt-cost ratios over the 20-
year horizon—8.9 for California producers and 5.5 for 
the nation as a whole—are similar to their counterparts 
over the 50-year horizon. The same was true when we 
simulated other scenarios and computed beneﬁt-cost 
ratios over 20 years rather than 50 years. We do not 
report these details for the other simulations, but they 
are available.
4.2. Alternative Scenarios
In addition to the baseline, we examined a number of 
other scenarios with the simulation model. These sce-
narios indicate how the results of the analysis change 
under alternative modeling assumptions, illustrating 
how sensitive the results are to those assumptions. 
They also provide a number of comparative dynamic 
results that reveal economic relationships implicit in 
the model structure. 
High-Impact and Low-Impact Scenarios
To examine the general sensitivity of results to 
modeling assumptions, we devised a “high impact” 
scenario and a “low impact” scenario, and we report 
the summary results for those simulations in columns 
3 and 4 of Table 4.2. For the high-impact scenario, 
we alter most of the parameters of the model by 10 
percent in the direction that would increase the impact 
of the policy; for the low-impact scenario, we alter the 
parameters by 10 percent in the opposite direction. 
These scenarios reveal how the results are affected by 
a modest but consistent upward or downward bias in 
parameter values. 
As shown at the bottom of the table, the combined 
effect of the parameter changes varies the estimated 
impacts of the marketing order by more than 10 per-
cent. Compared with a beneﬁt-cost ratio for producers 
of 9.6 in the baseline scenario, the ratio is 15.2 (58 
percent higher) in the high-impact scenario and 6.0 
(37 percent lower) in the low-impact scenario. Simi-
larly for the United States as a whole, compared with 
a beneﬁt-cost ratio of 5.9 in the baseline scenario, the 
ratio is 9.3 (57 percent higher) in the high-impact 
scenario and 3.7 (37 percent lower) in the low-impact 
scenario. Nevertheless, the beneﬁt-cost ratios are all 
well greater than zero, even in the low-impact scenario, 
indicating that the policy entails substantial net ben-
eﬁts for both producers and for the nation.
Underlying Market Parameters: The Demand Side
Table 4.3 compares estimated impacts in the 
baseline scenario with those for alternative scenarios 
in which we allow for different values of underlying 
elasticities of demand response to prices and demand 
growth. The alternative values are meant to represent 
reasonable estimates of upper and lower bounds for 
the parameters relative to the baseline that represents 
the most plausible point estimate. 
Changing either the domestic or the foreign 
demand elasticity has an impact on the results. In 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.3, the impacts of chang-
ing the domestic demand elasticity can be seen. 
Halving the domestic demand elasticity from –1.0 
to –0.5 increases the estimate of domestic consumer 
beneﬁts from $115.9 million to $201.5 million and 
increases the national beneﬁt-cost ratio from 5.9 to 
9.0. The same change in demand elasticity reduces 
the estimate of producer beneﬁts from $75.3 million 
to $72.3 million but leaves the producers’ beneﬁt-cost 
ratio relatively unaffected (an increase from 9.6 to 9.9) 
because changing the demand elasticity changes the 
incidence of the costs as well as the beneﬁts. These 
impacts are all consistent with a steeper demand curve 
and a smaller response by consumers to a change Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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Table 4.3. Implications of Demand Parameters for Consequences of the Marketing Order
      Low 
  Domestic Demand  Export Demand  Stock  High 
  Elasticity  Elasticity  Demand  Demand
  Baseline  Low  High  Low   High  Elasticity  Growth 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Demand Parameters
Domestic Demand (DD) Elasticity  –1.0  –0.5  –2.0  –1.0  –1.0  –1.0  –1.0
Export Demand (ED) Elasticity  –3.3  –3.3  –3.3  –1.7  –6.6  –3.3  –3.3
Stock Demand (SD) Elasticity  –2.0  –2.0  –2.0  –2.0  –2.0  –1.0  –2.0
Demand Growth Rate (percent)  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  5.4
Consequences of the Marketing Order for Prices and Quantities of California Pistachios
Induced Changes in Average of Annual Values, 2000–2050
Bearing Area (acres)  1,669.30  1,528.70  1,886.10  1,880.20 1,388.40  1,677.90  2,136.20
Production (million lbs)  8.62  7.87  9.77  9.66  7.21  8.66  11.13
Domestic Consumption (million lbs)  9.92  9.01  11.35  10.03  9.77  9.92  15.54
Exports (million lbs)  –1.25  –1.09  –1.52  –0.32  –2.53  –1.23  –4.26
Stocks (million lbs)  –1.30  –1.26  –1.36  –1.57  –1.00  –0.64  –2.71
New Plantings (acres)  125.67  113.10  145.50  139.20  107.30  126.70  169.00
Beneﬁts and Costs of the Marketing Order over a 50-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  32.67  30.37  36.68  33.16  31.91  32.56  48.68
Changes in U.S. Consumer  
Surplus (CS)  115.93  201.50  71.42  111.27  117.69  116.37  147.69
Net Changes in Foreign  
Surplus (FS)  –32.57  –32.27  –32.84  –34.25  –29.44  –33.01  –47.94
Changes in California  
Producer Surplus (PS)  75.33  72.25  80.89  92.27  59.98  75.78  109.84
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  191.26  273.75  152.32  203.54  177.67  192.15  257.53
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.90  9.00  4.20  6.10  5.30  5.90  5.30
Grower Share of Costs  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  9.60  9.90  9.20  11.60  7.80  9.70  9.40
in price. Doubling the domestic demand elasticity 
from –1.0 to –2.0 has an opposite effect of a similar 
magnitude. The comparatively small changes in the 
beneﬁt-cost ratios (especially for producers) suggest 
that the domestic demand elasticity is not a critical 
parameter for estimating the impact of the marketing 
order.
Halving and doubling the foreign (export) demand 
elasticity have greater effects on the beneﬁt-cost ratios. 
As reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.3, halv-
ing the elasticity from –3.3 to –1.65 increases the 
producers’ beneﬁt-cost ratio from 9.6 to 11.6 while 
doubling the elasticity to –6.6 reduces the beneﬁt-
cost ratio from 9.8 to 7.8. Like the domestic demand Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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elasticity, this parameter is not critical to the overall 
efﬁcacy of the marketing order. 
Storage plays an important role in smoothing 
out year-to-year variations in price. In the baseline 
scenario, we model a stock demand parameterized 
with the average 1997–2001 stock level and a demand 
elasticity of –2 and we assume that the demand for 
stocks grows over time at the same rate as domestic 
and export demand, 3.6 percent per year. A scenario 
where the elasticity of demand for stocks is halved 
to –1.0 is reported in column 6 of Table 4.3. This 
parameter change has virtually no effect on the esti-
mated impacts of the marketing order. 
In the base scenario, it was assumed that domes-
tic, foreign, and stock demand would all grow at 3.6 
percent per year. In the scenario reported in column 7 
of Table 4.3, the underlying growth rate in demand is 
increased by 50 percent of the baseline to 5.4 percent 
per year. The result is a much larger industry over 
time with correspondingly greater beneﬁts and costs 
from the marketing order. Producer beneﬁts increase 
by about 45 percent over the baseline and national 
Table 4.4. Implications of Compliance Costs and Probability of an Aﬂatoxin Event
    Probability 
  Compliance Cost  of an Aﬂatoxin Event
  Baseline  High  Low  Low  Zero  High 
  1  2  3  4  5  6
Impact Parameters
Aﬂatoxin Case Probability
   without Marketing Order (percent)  4.0  4.0  4.0  2.0  0.0  8.0
   with Marketing Order (percent)  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  0.0  4.0
Compliance Costs (cents per lb)  0.525  0.788  0.350  0.525  0.525  0.525
Consequences of the Marketing Order for Prices and Quantities of California Pistachios
Induced Changes in Average of Annual Values, 2000–2050
Bearing Area (acres)  1,669.31  1,595.10  1,718.80  911.40  135.40 3,020.50
Production (million lbs)  8.62  8.24  8.88  4.68  0.70  15.63
Domestic Consumption (million lbs)  9.92  9.34  10.30  5.42  1.05  17.85
Exports (million lbs)  –1.25  –1.06  –1.38  –0.71  –0.35  –2.12
Stocks (million lbs)  –1.30  –1.23  –1.34  –0.67  –0.13  –2.37
New Plantings (acres)  125.67  120.50  129.10  73.70  9.40  229.50
Beneﬁts and Costs of the Marketing Order over a 50-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  32.67  48.93  21.80  32.78  32.92  32.43
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  115.93  101.86  125.32  70.83  25.60  193.78
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –32.57  –30.55  –33.92  –17.48  –3.68  –55.76
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  75.33  71.37  77.67  39.78  7.12  132.08
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  191.26  173.23  203.28  110.60  32.72  325.86
Beneﬁt–Cost Ratios
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.90  3.50  9.30  3.40  1.00  10.00
Grower Share of Costs  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  9.60  6.10  14.90  5.10  0.90  17.00Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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beneﬁts increase by 35 percent, but the effect on the 
producers’ beneﬁt-cost ratio is small (a decrease from 
9.6 to 9.4) and the effects on the national beneﬁt-cost 
ratio are modest (a decrease from 5.9 to 5.3). Hence, 
although this parameter has important long-term 
implications for the size of the industry and the total 
beneﬁts and costs of the marketing order, it has little 
impact on the viability of the marketing order. 
Parameters Deﬁning Marketing-Order Impacts
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 compare estimated impacts in 
the baseline scenario with those for alternative sce-
narios in which we allow for different values of the 
parameters that deﬁne the impacts of the marketing 
order on supply and demand—measures of costs of 
inspection and compliance, probability of an aﬂatoxin 
event, demand shocks associated with an event, and 
demand changes in response to greater consumer 
conﬁdence in the product as a result of certiﬁcation. 
The alternative values are meant to represent reason-
able estimates of upper and lower bounds compared 
with the baseline, which represents the most plausible 
point estimate, and the wide range of values for some 
of these parameters reﬂects our comparative uncer-
tainty about these numbers relative to the underlying 
market parameters previously discussed.
Inspection and compliance costs can have a large 
impact on the beneﬁt-cost ratio under the marketing 
order. A scenario where these costs are increased by 
half of the baseline value of 0.525 cents per pound is 
shown in column 2 of Table 4.4. The main effect of 
increasing the unit costs by 50 percent is an increase 
in the total costs of compliance by 50 percent, from 
$33 million to $48.9 million—an increase of $15.9 
million. Hence, national beneﬁts are lower by $20 
million and producer beneﬁts are lower by $4 mil-
lion, reﬂecting the differential incidence of the costs 
of compliance. In turn, there are implications for the 
demand and supply responses to the policy, which are 
slightly muted relative to the baseline. Hence, the ben-
eﬁt-cost ratios are affected differentially. The effect on 
the producers’ beneﬁt-cost ratio is reasonably large (a 
decrease by more than one-third from 9.6 to 6.1) and 
the effects on the national beneﬁt-cost ratio are com-
parable (a decrease by more than one-third from 5.9 
to 3.5). Analogous but opposite patterns are revealed 
when we simulate a reduction in compliance costs of 
the same magnitude. The range of beneﬁt-cost ratios 
suggests that inspection and compliance costs are an 
important factor in the assessment of the marketing 
order. Fortunately, because the protocol of testing is 
deﬁned within the marketing order and the industry 
has experience with testing for foreign markets, these 
costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy and 
the baseline estimates can therefore be taken with 
reasonable conﬁdence.
In the baseline case, a primary source of beneﬁts 
from the marketing order is through a reduction in 
the probability of an aﬂatoxin event. The probability 
of an event with and without the marketing order is 
among the most difﬁcult parameters to estimate given 
the lack of historical experience or other data. The re-
sults of three scenarios dealing with this parameter are 
reported in columns 4 through 6 of Table 4.4. In the 
baseline scenario, we assumed the annual probability 
of an event would be 4 percent without a marketing 
order and 2 percent with a marketing order. In the 
“low probability” scenario reported in column 6, these 
two probabilities are both halved—to 2 percent and 1 
percent, respectively. In the “high probability” scenario 
reported in column 6, these two probabilities are both 
doubled—to 8 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
And in the “zero probability” scenario reported in 
column 5, these two probabilities are both set equal 
to zero—representing a world in which there is no 
real risk of an aﬂatoxin event and the only impact of 
the marketing order on demand is from certiﬁcation, 
which causes a permanent increase in demand.
First, consider the zero-probability scenario 
described in column 5. In this case, the increase in 
domestic demand facing producers in response to 
certiﬁcation (1 cent per pound) is almost twice as large 
as the demand-decreasing effect of the cost of certiﬁca-
tion (0.525 cents per pound) and the consequences 
follow straightforwardly from that fact. The producer, 
national, and global beneﬁt-cost ratios are all similar, 
about 0.9, because the present value of gross beneﬁts 
in each case is not quite twice the present value of 
costs. This element of the overall beneﬁt-cost picture 
is a constant component of all the scenarios in which 
we allow for domestic demand enhancement associ-
ated with certiﬁcation.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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In the low-probability scenario described in 
column 4 of Table 4.4, there are additional beneﬁts 
when the probability of an aﬂatoxin event is 2 percent 
without a marketing order and is reduced to 1 percent 
by the order. Producers receive a net beneﬁt of $7.1 
million from certiﬁcation (column 5) and a further 
$32.7 million from the reduced impacts of aﬂatoxin 
events on demand, both domestically and in export 
markets, such that their total beneﬁt is $39.8 million. 
Consequently, the producers’ beneﬁt-cost ratio is 
5.1 (in the low-probability scenario) rather than 0.9 
(in the zero-probability scenario), both of which are 
much lower than that of the baseline scenario (9.6). 
Table 4.5. Implications of Other Parameters for Consequences of the Marketing Order
  Foreign Demand Impact  Zero Impact of
  Baseline  Zero  Large  Quality Assurance 
  1  2  3  4
Impact Parameters
Foreign Demand/Domestic Shock (percent)  21.50  0.00  43.00  21.50
Domestic Demand Enhancement (dollars per lb)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00
Planting Elasticity (percent)  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00
Consequences of the Marketing Order for Prices and Quantities of California Pistachios
Induced Changes in Average of Annual Values, 2000–2050
Bearing Area (acres)  1,669.31  1,366.00  1,990.70  1,386.50
Production (million lbs)  8.62  7.05  10.28  7.16
Domestic Consumption (million lbs)  9.92  10.03  9.79  7.72
Exports (million lbs)  –1.25  –2.94  0.54  –0.52
Stocks (million lbs)  –1.30  –1.09  –1.51  –1.03
New Plantings (acres)  125.67  101.70  151.10  106.10
Beneﬁts and Costs of the Marketing Order over a 50-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  32.67  32.66  32.68  32.48
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  115.93  121.00  110.33  62.46
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –32.57  –37.46  –27.11  –24.85
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  75.33  62.89  88.57  60.29
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  191.26  183.89  198.90  122.75
Beneﬁt–Cost Ratios
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.90  5.60  6.10  3.80
Grower Share of Costs  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  9.60  8.00  11.30  7.80
Similarly, the national benefit-cost ratio is much 
greater in the baseline scenario (5.9) than in the 
low-probability scenario (3.4) or the zero-probability 
scenario (1.0). The opposite pattern of effects can be 
seen when comparing the results in the high-probabil-
ity scenario in column 6 with those in the baseline, 
low-probability, and zero-probability scenarios. The 
total beneﬁts and the beneﬁt-cost ratios are very sensi-
tive to changes in the probability of an aﬂatoxin event 
when the introduction of a marketing order reduces 
that probability by one-half.
Table 4.5 reports the results of sensitivity analysis 
with respect to other parameters that deﬁne the market Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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response to an aﬂatoxin event and the marketing order. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.5 represent scenarios in 
which the spillover effects of a U.S. aﬂatoxin event on 
foreign demand are reduced to zero (rather than 21.5 
percent of the U.S. shock as deﬁned in the baseline 
scenario) or doubled from the baseline to 43 percent 
of the U.S. demand shock. Eliminating the spillover 
effect of an aﬂatoxin event means that the beneﬁts 
from the marketing order, which mitigated those ef-
fects, are commensurately reduced. Hence, most of the 
effects on quantities and prices are smaller in column 
2 relative to the baseline in column 1 (or column 3) 
(the exception is the effect on exports, which is a larger 
negative effect). The producer beneﬁts are smaller but 
the losses in foreign consumer surplus and the gains 
in domestic consumer surplus are larger. The national 
beneﬁt-cost ratio is somewhat smaller than in the 
baseline and the grower beneﬁt-cost ratio is somewhat 
smaller as well, reduced from 9.6 to 8.0. Doubling the 
importance of spillover effects has opposite effects on 
the results, as can be seen by comparing the measures 
in column 3 with the baseline in column 1. Notably, 
the effects of the marketing order on exports are now 
positive (the effect on exports is negative in all but 
three scenarios) and the losses in foreign consumer 
surplus are smaller, as are the gains in domestic con-
sumer surplus. While the numbers are affected, this 
aspect of the model speciﬁcation does not seem to 
have important implications for conclusions regarding 
the impact of the marketing order.
In the baseline scenario, we assumed that domestic 
consumers would be willing to pay 1 cent per pound 
more for pistachios with USDA inspection because 
of the certiﬁcation and labeling aspects. A scenario 
excluding this effect is used to assess the importance 
of the labeling impact for the results, and the results 
in that scenario are shown in column 4 of Table 4.5. 
Compared to the baseline, producer benefits are 
reduced by $15 million (from $75.3 million to $60.3 
million) and domestic consumer beneﬁts are reduced 
by $53.7 million (from $115.9 million to $62.5 mil-
lion). Hence, national beneﬁts are reduced by about 
$69 million (from $191.3 million to $122.8 million) 
and global beneﬁts are reduced by $60.8 million. 
These ﬁgures indicate that certiﬁcation and labeling 
could represent a substantial share of the total beneﬁts 
and that the overall estimate could be sensitive to as-
sumptions about this aspect. We assume an increase 
in willingness-to-pay of 1 cent per pound (close to 
1 percent of the producer price), which seems very 
modest but is nevertheless a speculative estimate. The 
estimates of beneﬁts associated with this effect could 
be interpreted as representing the consequences for 
each cent of increased willingness-to-pay over a range 
of up to a few cents per pound. In addition, we note 
that the beneﬁt-cost ratios remain favorable even when 
we assume that there is no effect of certiﬁcation and 
labeling per se on demand.
Finally, we conducted a further set of simula-
tions to evaluate the implications of the end-period 
assumptions (recall that in the plantings model we 
projected the annual ﬂows of net revenue per acre in 
2050 forward for 2051 through 2100). To consider 
the robustness of the results, we scaled this stream 
of revenue per acre up by 20 percent and down by 20 
percent and we report the results relative to the base-
line case in Table 4.6. These results show that different 
valuations of the stream of revenue from 2050 forward 
have some effect on plantings (and hence production, 
prices, and so on), especially in later years, but with 
only minor consequences for the average values of 
these variables within the period 2000–2050. The 
beneﬁt-cost ratios are not affected.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Table 4.6. Implications of End-Time Valuation for Simulated Values
    20 Percent Higher  20 Percent Lower 
    Revenue per Acre  Revenue per Acre 
  Baseline  2051–2100  2051–2100
Induced Changes in Average Annual Values for California Pistachios, 2000–2050
Bearing Area (acres)  1,669.30  1,706.20  1,619.40
Production (million lbs)  8.62  8.81  8.37
U.S. Consumption (million lbs)  9.92  10.01  9.78
Exports (million lbs)  –1.25  –1.16  –1.37
Stocks (million lbs)  –1.30  –1.27  –1.32
New Plantings (acres)  125.70  132.60  117.70
Induced Changes in Final Values for California Pistachios in 2050
Bearing Area in 2050 (acres)  3,605.50  3,803.90  3,381.60
Stocks in 2050 (million lbs)  –2.31  –2.21  –2.40
Production in 2050 (million lbs)  25.95  27.23  24.50
Domestic Consumption in 2050 (million lbs)  26.47  27.22  25.61
Exports in 2050 (million lbs)  0.29  0.84  –0.31
Consequences over 50-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  32.67  32.80  32.43
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  115.93  117.60  113.38
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –32.57  –32.03  –32.99
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  75.33  74.70  75.70
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  191.25  192.30  189.09
Beneﬁt–Cost Ratios over 50-Year Horizon
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.90  5.90  5.80
Grower Share of Costs  0.24  0.24  0.24
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  9.60  9.60  9.60
Consequences over 20-Year Horizon
Present Values in 2004 in Millions of 2003 Dollars
Cost of Compliance (CC)  13.02  13.00  12.98
Changes in U.S. Consumer Surplus (CS)  33.76  33.62  33.44
Net Changes in Foreign Surplus (FS)  –20.97  –20.89  –20.92
Changes in California Producer Surplus (PS)  37.99  37.89  37.91
National Beneﬁts (NS = CS + PS)  71.76  71.50  71.35
Beneﬁt–Cost Ratios over 20-Year Horizon     
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  5.50  5.50  5.50
Grower Share of Costs  0.33  0.33  0.33
Grower Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio  8.90  8.90  8.90Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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A
n aﬂatoxin event could impose serious costs on 
the California pistachio industry. The proposed 
marketing order is intended to reduce the odds of an 
event, mitigate the consequences if an event should 
occur, and provide some quality assurance to buyers 
to offset the negative consequences of concerns over 
the potential for a food scare affecting pistachios. In 
this study, we have modeled the market for California 
pistachios to provide an ex ante assessment of the 
beneﬁts and costs and other consequences of the 
proposed marketing order looking forward 50 years 
from its introduction. Our approach used a stochastic 
dynamic simulation of the industry under scenarios 
with and without the marketing order to compare the 
stream of simulated outcomes and the consequences 
for measures of economic welfare of producers in 
the industry, consumers, the nation as a whole, and 
the world.
To assess the implications of the marketing order 
required incorporating into the simulation a number 
of parameters representing the odds of an aﬂatoxin 
event, its consequences for demand, and the extent to 
which a marketing order would reduce those magni-
tudes. Many of these parameters are hard to estimate 
because relevant historical data are not available 
for pistachios and it is hard to extrapolate from the 
information that is available with any precision or 
conﬁdence. As well as simulating the consequences 
implied by “best guess” values for key parameters, 
we undertook extensive sensitivity analysis to evalu-
ate the importance of particular assumptions about 
parameters.
Across the full range of parameters used in the 
analysis, the beneﬁt-cost analysis was always favorable 
to the policy: the measured beneﬁts to producers, the 
nation, and the world always well exceeded the cor-
responding measure of costs, typically by many times. 
The beneﬁt-cost ratios were generally greater than 
3:1 and often greater than 6:1, which means there is 
substantial leeway to accommodate potential errors 
in assumptions and yet have favorable ﬁndings. In 
present-value terms, the beneﬁts to producers were 
estimated in the baseline scenario at $75.3 million. 
Domestic consumers would gain $115.9 million, 60 
percent of the overall beneﬁts. These are signiﬁcant 
values and are large relative to the cost of compliance 
with the program, which is a very small amount—
about one-half of 1 percent of the current value of 
domestic sales.
This study revealed a number of issues that may be 
important in analyses of other policies in the context 
of perennial crops and in analyses of food safety and 
quality assurance policies in a more general setting. 
First, analyses of food safety and food scares deal 
with events that occur with a very low frequency (or 
low probability) that is difﬁcult to estimate with any 
precision and that, when they do occur, can have di-
sastrous consequences for demand. The modeling of 
low-probability catastrophic events might not be well 
represented by the use of simple comparative statics 
and averages; hence our use of an explicit stochastic 
dynamic simulation. Second, in the case of perennial 
crops, analysis becomes particularly complicated be-
cause the initial impacts of the policies on demand 
precede by many years the induced supply response. 
The dynamic path of costs and beneﬁts and their 
changing incidence over time are critical elements of 
the story. These elements are difﬁcult to model but 
might be pivotal determinants of the economics of 
the policy. 
5. CONCLUSIONGiannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Table A1. World Pistachio Production by Producing Country for 1980–2003 in Millions of Pounds
                Total 
Year  Irana  Iranb  U.S.  Turkey  Syria  Greece  Italy  Worldc
1980  55.0  NA  27.2  15.4  11.0  5.6  0.4  114.6
1981  92.4  NA  14.4  46.2  20.2  5.0  9.8  188.0
1982  50.6  NA  43.9  24.2  17.6  3.6  0.4  140.3
1983  132.0  NA  26.3  39.6  20.2  5.6  8.8  232.5
1984  154.0  NA  63.0  33.0  23.8  4.4  0.4  278.6
1985  140.0  NA  27.1  72.6  22.0  5.0  4.4  271.1
1986  130.0  NA  76.7  44.0  31.4  5.0  0.6  287.7
1987  70.0  NA  33.0  55.0  27.6  8.8  8.8  203.2
1988  180.0  187.4  93.4  33.0  39.4  6.6  0.6  353.0
1989  70.0  88.2  38.8  77.2  34.8  10.8  7.2  238.8
1990  200.0  209.4  119.8  30.8  44.0  5.8  0.6  401.0
1991  401.2  99.2  76.3  99.2  24.0  5.0  6.6  612.3
1992  445.3  242.5  146.5  44.0  44.0  10.0  0.6  690.4
1993  504.9  220.5  150.9  110.0  48.4  9.0  8.8  832.0
1994  429.9  143.3  128.3  55.1  52.9  9.3  0.7  676.2
1995  518.1  264.6  147.7  66.1  35.3  8.8  4.9  780.9
1996  175.0  NA  104.3  88.2  39.7  9.6  0.7  417.5
1997  150.0  100.0  179.5  88.1  33.1  11.0  8.8  470.5
1998  375.0  NA  187.5  55.1  79.4  11.0  1.1  709.1
1999  289.2  154.0  122.4  88.0  66.3  11.0  5.8  582.7
2000  264.6  396.8  241.6  132.3  68.3  14.3  0.2  721.3
2001  253.5  154.3  160.3  77.2  88.0  14.3  0.2  593.5
2002  661.0  396.8  302.4  88.2  86.4  18.7  5.5  1,162.2
2003  683.0  330.7  118.0  110.2  110.2  18.7  5.5  1,045.6
a  Source: Iran’s Ministry of Agriculture (not veriﬁable).
b  Source: Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative (RPPC) (not veriﬁable).
c  World total includes Iran’s production as given by Iran’s Ministry of Agriculture.
Source: USDA; California Pistachio Commission.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
46
Table A2. California Pistachios – Bearing, Nonbearing, Total, and New-Planting Acres and Yield  
per Bearing Acre, 1980–2003
  Bearing  Nonbearing    New-Planting  Yield in 
Year  Acres  Acres  Total Acres  Acres  Pounds per Acre
1980  25,773  8,989  34,762  1,382  1,055
1981  27,541  13,084  40,625  6,377  523
1982  29,902  15,619  45,521  5,478  1,468
1983  31,143  15,959  47,102  4,183  844
1984  30,788  16,794  47,582  2,506  2,027
1985  32,332  18,739  51,071  5,013  838
1986  34,243  20,438  54,681  2,299  2,187
1987  40,985  16,365  57,350  1,265  818
1988  47,234  10,258  57,492  1,533  2,117
1989  50,900  12,000  62,900  3,062  800
1990  53,700  11,100  64,800  2,687  2,375
1991  55,700  13,300  69,000  3,508  1,465
1992  56,500  13,900  70,400  2,902  2,592
1993  57,000  15,700  72,700  2,639  2,648
1994  57,507  16,633  74,140  3,514  2,232
1995  60,300  13,400  73,700  3,397  2,449
1996  64,300  17,100  81,400  4,209  1,622
1997  65,373  17,062  82,435  3,303  2,746
1998  68,000  19,300  87,300  3,620  2,757
1999  71,000  21,000  92,000  5,496  1,724
2000  74,578  21,730  96,307  3,903  3,239
2001  78,000  23,500  101,500  5,151  2,055
2002  83,000  23,000  106,000  1,593  3,644
2003  88,000  23,000  111,000  658  1,341
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service; California Pistachio Commission.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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Table A3. Production and Quality of California Pistachios, 1980–2003
  Total  Open In-Shell  Closed Shell  Shelling Stock
  Production  Production  Percent  Production  Percent  Production  Percent 
Year  (million lbs)  (million lbs)  of Total  (million lbs)  of Total  (million lbs)  of Total
1980  27.2  18.6  68.4  –  –  8.6  31.6
1981  14.1  10.9  77.1  –  –  3.2  22.9
1982  43.2  37.4  86.5  –  –  5.8  13.5
1983  26.3  20.9  79.4  –  –  5.4  20.6
1984  62.6  45.2  72.1  –  –  17.5  27.9
1985  27.3  22.5  82.4  –  –  4.8  17.6
1986  76.7  64.5  84.1  –  –  12.2  15.9
1987  33.5  29.2  87.1  –  –  4.3  12.9
1988  96.4  72.0  74.7  –  –  24.4  25.3
1989  39.5  33.2  84.0  –  –  6.3  16.0
1990  117.3  92.7  79.0  –  –  24.6  21.0
1991  76.4  58.9  77.1  –  –  17.5  22.9
1992  146.5  114.3  78.0  –  –  32.2  22.0
1993  150.9  112.6  74.7  –  –  38.3  25.3
1994  128.3  94.1  73.3  –  –  34.3  26.7
1995  147.7  107.3  72.7  –  –  40.3  27.3
1996  104.3  84.5  81.0  –  –  19.9  19.0
1997  179.5  136.6  76.1  –  –  42.9  23.9
1998  187.5  137.6  73.4  38.6  20.6  11.2  6.0
1999  122.4  104.4  85.3  12.0  9.8  6.0  4.9
2000  241.6  188.8  78.2  38.6  16.0  14.1  5.8
2001  160.3  125.8  78.5  26.4  16.4  8.1  5.1
2002  302.4  241.7  79.9  42.1  13.9  18.7  6.2
2003  118.0  89.2  75.6  22.1  18.7  6.7  5.7
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service; California Pistachio Commission processor producer delivery reports.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Table A4. Quantity, Price, and Value of California Pistachios, 1980–2003
        Value per 
  Production  Average Return  Total Value  Bearing Acre 
Year  (million pounds)  ( dollars per pound)  (million dollars)  (dollars per acre)
1980  27.2  2.05  55.80  2,165
1981  14.4  1.36  19.60  712
1982  43.9  1.49  63.70  2,130
1983  26.3  1.41  37.30  1,198
1984  63.0  0.98  61.70  2,004
1985  27.1  1.37  36.60  1,132
1986  76.7  1.12  85.90  2,509
1987  33.0  1.37  47.20  1,152
1988  93.4  1.22  109.30  2,314
1989  38.8  1.63  63.20  1,242
1990  119.9  1.02  129.50  2,412
1991  76.3  1.25  100.70  1,808
1992  146.5  1.03  150.90  2,671
1993  150.9  1.07  161.50  2,833
1994  128.3  0.92  118.10  2,054
1995  147.7  1.09  160.94  2,669
1996  104.3  1.16  120.99  1,882
1997  179.5  1.13  202.84  3,103
1998  187.5  1.03  193.10  2,840
1999  122.4  1.33  162.78  2,293
2000  241.6  1.01  239.18  3,207
2001  160.3  1.01  166.71  2,137
2002  302.4  1.11  335.66  4,044
2003  118.0  1.15  135.70  1,542
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service; California Pistachio Commission.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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Table A5. Production, Quantity, and Price of California Pistachios and Almonds, 1980–2003
  Almonds  Pistachios
  Price  Production  Price  Production 
  (dollars per pound)  (million pounds)  (dollars per pound)  (million pounds)
1980  $1.47  322  $2.05  27
1981  $0.78  408  $1.36  14
1982  $0.94  347  $1.49  44
1983  $1.04  242  $1.41  26
1984  $0.77  590  $0.98  63
1985  $0.80  465  $1.37  27
1986  $1.92  250  $1.12  77
1987  $1.00  660  $1.37  33
1988  $1.05  590  $1.22  93
1989  $1.02  490  $1.63  39
1990  $0.93  660  $1.02  120
1991  $1.19  490  $1.25  76
1992  $1.30  548  $1.03  147
1993  $1.94  490  $1.07  151
1994  $1.34  735  $0.92  128
1995  $2.48  370  $1.09  148
1996  $2.08  510  $1.16  104
1997  $1.56  759  $1.13  180
1998  $1.41  520  $1.03  188
1999  $0.86  833  $1.33  122
2000  $0.97  703  $1.01  242
2001  $0.91  830  $1.01  160
2002  $1.11  1,090  $1.11  302
2003  $1.42  1,040  $1.15  118
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service; California Pistachio Commission; USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service.Giannini Foundation Monograph 46
50
Table A6. Allocation of California Pistachios among Markets for 1980/81–2003/04a in Thousands of Pounds
  Utilized  Loss and  Marketable    Beginning  Total  Ending 
Seasonb   Production  Exemptc   Productiond  Importse  Stocksd  Supplyf  Stocksd  Exportse
1980/81  11,675  –  11,672  1,175  5,000  17,847  5,135  1,840
1981/82  5,887  –  5,888  1,817  5,135  12,840  2,061  1,480
1982/83  16,984  –  16,986  2,819  2,061  21,866  6,581  3,247
1983/84  11,114  –  11,115  6,683  6,581  24,378  4,977  1,815
1984/85  27,512  –  27,507  7,284  4,977  39,768  11,256  2,758
1985/86  11,518  –  11,518  14,875  11,256  37,649  7,362  1,658
1986/87  31,009  –  31,005  5,357  7,362  43,724  15,005  2,183
1987/88  14,597  18  14,579  2,166  15,005  31,750  5,487  3,469
1988/89  45,684  932  44,752  854  5,487  51,093  14,897  6,442
1989/90  18,213  184  18,029  2,124  14,897  35,051  10,045  5,519
1990/91  42,047  0  42,047  853  10,045  52,945  16,864  8,682
1991/92  25,667  190  25,476  250  16,864  42,590  6,072  15,413
1992/93  65,585  223  65,362  396  6,072  71,830  17,595  27,763
1993/94  62,359  448  61,911  494  17,595  80,000  25,672  21,066
1994/95  51,375  125  51,250  732  25,672  77,654  16,825  25,275
1995/96  64,681  5,177  59,504  422  16,825  76,751  13,795  31,540
1996/97  40,425  0  40,425  944  13,795  55,163  7,696  32,202
1997/98  74,930  0  74,930  417  7,696  83,043  9,742  36,150
1998/99  78,208  0  78,208  549  9,742  88,499  21,264  25,793
1999/00  58,083  0  58,083  262  21,264  79,608  10,462  19,803
2000/01  114,164  0  114,164  920  10,462  125,547  33,329  32,641
2001/02  80,733  0  80,733  532  33,329  114,594  12,425  44,744
2002/03  149,513  0  149,513  764  12,425  162,702  56,180  44,449
2003/04g  57,448  0  57,448  1,287  58,180  114,915  23,384  34,999
a  The conversion factor from in-shell to shelled basis varies year to year for production, stocks, and exports and was 0.39 in 1996/97, 0.42 
in 1997/98 and 1998/99, 0.47 in 1999/00 and 2000/01, 0.49 in 2001/02, and 0.48 in 2002/03. For imports, the conversion factor was a 
constant 0.40.
b  Season beginning September 1.
c  Inedibles and noncommercial usage.
d  California Pistachio Commission.
e  Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.
f  Marketable production plus imports and beginning stocks.
g  Preliminary estimates.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.Economic Consequences of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios
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Table A7. Validation of Storage Model: Average Values from Baseline Simulation
  Change  Stock  Value of  Trading Proﬁt as a Share  Stocks/ 
  in Stocks  Trading Proﬁta  Production  of Value of Production  Production 
  (million lbs)  (million 2003 $)  (million 2003 $)  (percent)  (percent)
  (St – St–1)  (πt)  (Vt)  (100 × πt / Vt)  (100 × |πt| / Vt)  (100 × St / Qt)
2000  1.38  –1.67  231.80  –0.72  0.72  24.18
2001  –0.68  0.83  231.91  0.36  0.36  24.39
2002  4.28  –5.19  252.65  –2.05  2.05  23.86
2003  0.43  –0.52  253.72  –0.20  0.20  24.28
2004  2.35  –2.84  266.61  –1.07  1.07  24.06
2005  1.46  –1.77  273.48  –0.65  0.65  24.20
2006  2.72  –3.30  286.27  –1.15  1.15  24.12
2007  5.30  –6.42  306.10  –2.10  2.10  23.99
2008  3.36  –4.07  316.80  –1.29  1.29  24.21
2009  2.89  –3.51  328.51  –1.07  1.07  24.27
2010  3.49  –4.23  342.76  –1.24  1.24  24.26
2011  2.10  –2.54  352.15  –0.72  0.72  24.39
2012  4.40  –5.33  370.00  –1.44  1.44  24.28
2013  3.66  –4.44  383.28  –1.16  1.16  24.39
2014  5.70  –6.90  403.93  –1.71  1.71  24.28
2015  4.22  –5.11  419.02  –1.22  1.22  24.35
2016  7.25  –8.78  442.01  –1.99  1.99  24.25
2017  1.61  –1.95  449.33  –0.43  0.43  24.56
2018  9.96  –12.06  482.00  –2.50  2.50  24.15
2019  –2.53  3.06  478.33  0.64  0.64  24.76
2020  11.31  –13.70  519.28  –2.64  2.64  24.10
2021  –1.96  2.37  515.38  0.46  0.46  24.77
2022  12.85  –15.57  558.64  –2.79  2.79  24.14
2023  4.85  –5.87  570.19  –1.03  1.03  24.51
2024  7.18  –8.70  595.39  –1.46  1.46  24.41
2025  11.76  –14.25  624.02  –2.28  2.28  24.34
2026  1.92  –2.32  635.58  –0.37  0.37  24.65
2027  14.48  –17.54  674.73  –2.60  2.60  24.26
2028  1.52  –1.84  684.72  –0.27  0.27  24.68
2029  9.41  –11.40  717.69  –1.59  1.59  24.45
2030  5.13  –6.22  739.28  –0.84  0.84  24.57
2031  8.05  –9.76  769.89  –1.27  1.27  24.46
2032  13.55  –16.41  803.81  –2.04  2.04  24.35
2033  11.62  –14.08  829.82  –1.70  1.70  24.46
2034  9.66  –11.70  857.99  –1.36  1.36  24.52
2035  10.64  –12.89  889.73  –1.45  1.45  24.50
continued on following pageGiannini Foundation Monograph 46
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Table A7 (continued)
  Change  Stock  Value of  Trading Proﬁt as a Share  Stocks/ 
  in Stocks  Trading Proﬁta  Production  of Value of Production  Production 
  (million lbs)  (million 2003 $)  (million 2003 $)  (percent)  (percent)
  (St – St–1)  (πt)  (Vt)  (100 × πt / Vt)  (100 × |πt| / Vt)  (100 × St / Qt)
2036  5.77  –6.99  916.84  –0.76  0.76  24.62
2037  12.99  –15.74  955.30  –1.65  1.65  24.49
2038  9.46  –11.46  984.90  –1.16  1.16  24.61
2039  16.83  –20.39  1,024.60  –1.99  1.99  24.48
2040  12.42  –15.04  1,055.84  –1.42  1.42  24.60
2041  20.69  –25.06  1,096.91  –2.29  2.29  24.44
2042  3.11  –3.77  1,125.00  –0.34  0.34  24.77
2043  29.27  –35.47  1,175.78  –3.02  3.02  24.36
2044  –9.99  12.11  1,197.38  1.01  1.01  25.00
2045  33.98  –41.16  1,265.25  –3.25  3.25  24.32
2046  –9.35  11.33  1,287.88  0.88  0.88  24.95
2047  36.38  –44.08  1,360.29  –3.24  3.24  24.28
2048  12.07  –14.62  1,389.31  –1.05  1.05  24.66
2049  19.58  –23.72  1,439.92  –1.65  1.65  24.59
2050  39.47  –47.82  1,479.76  –3.23  3.23  24.42
Mean for 50-Year Horizon, 2000–2050b
  8.39  –10.17  698.27  –1.34  1.47  24.41
Mean for 20-Year Horizon, 2000–2020b
  3.55  –4.31  351.90  –1.16  1.25  24.25
Mean for 20-Year Horizon, 1979–2001c
  2.08  –2.65  144.69  2.93  23.00  37.35
Note: All monetary values are in real 2003 dollars.
a  Stock trading proﬁt is the product of change in stocks and current price. 
b  Mean of simulated values in the table.
c  Mean of actual values, which are not included in the table.The University of California prohibits discrimination or harassment of any person on the basis of race, color, national 
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